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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
When I was five years old I met a girl with profound intellectual 
disabilities for the first time in my life. As I recall our encounter it was 
one of confusion, fascination, consternation and affirmation. Confusion 
– because of her being so different from anyone I had ever met. 
Fascination – because she behaved differently and she had a strange 
and yet beautiful body. Consternation – because I saw how other 
people looked down at her and reacted anxiously upon her presence. 
Affirmation – because I, despite my funny toes, realized that I look like 
most people. For the first time I was presented with the great paradox 
of disability as otherness: people with disabilities are not desired in this 
world because they are too different, but at the same time they are much 
needed because they make the presumed normal people feel normal. 
The values of modern liberal societies are characterized by 
independence, individualism, success and productivity, and in such 
societies people with disabilities are, like other “weak” citizens, viewed 
as an economic and human burden. Because people with disabilities are 
presumed to place a burden on both families and the society, and 
because they are presumed to suffer greatly from their disability, 
modern biotechnology has come to be a highly desired way of dealing 
with the fear of disability. And despite efforts worldwide to increase 
the political rights of people with disabilities, they remain invisible and 
unimportant to many.1  
Ever since I was five years old, people with various disabilities have 
been neither invisible nor unimportant in my life. In fact, there is no 
doubt about what, or rather who, my greatest inspiration for writing 
this thesis has been: the people with disabilities who have crossed my 
path over the years, either in real life or through their stories in books 
and the media. Especially the people I have helped care for in various 
care homes, and the wonderful lads in the L’Arche community who I 
was fortunate to live with in my early days as a doctoral student, have 
                                                     
1 Newell 2010, 172; Vanier 2010, 21. 
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had a huge impact on my research and writing. Little did I know then, 
in the beginning of my writing process, when my interests were 
directed at analysing the concept of human dignity in ethical theories 
on prenatal screening, that the life stories of people with disabilities 
would become a primary resource not only for my own personal 
inspiration, but as a material and a methodological resource as well. 
Little did I know then, that my dissertation would become a 
contribution to an inter-disciplinary field of research, for which I have 
found no better description than feminist disability theology.  
The journey into this fascinating research field has truly been one of 
new discoveries and unexpected encounters, as any good research 
project ought to be naturally. Not only have I discovered a whole new 
world of research material, but different ways of doing theological 
research too. What originally was intended to become a monography 
turned instead out to be a thesis with four individual articles. Each 
article represents, in one way or another, the process of discoveries that 
I have made along the way, and perhaps it is only now when the thesis 
is done that I see what an immense resource disability as both a concept 
and human experience is in approaching a wide range of important 
questions.       
Although it became apparent already in the process of writing my 
first article, one thing that keeps surprising me still after writing three 
more, is how disability truly is at the core of many medical, political, 
cultural and theological discourses – implicitly or explicitly, either by 
its presence or absence, by its mentioning or by leaving it out of the 
conversation. In various mainstream bioethical theories, as well as in 
many theological and feminist approaches to human being, human 
dignity, embodiment, health, and reproductive issues, disability stands 
out as the representation of the unpredictable, the unstable, the 
unexpected, and the undesirable.  
Hence, disparaging the so called eugenic logic2 that tells us that the 
world would be a better place if disability could be eliminated is at the 
                                                     
2 The expression eugenic logic springs from the eugenic ideology and practices that 
emerged in 19th century, which is more extensively discussed in the chapter The 
Normalcy Narrative. At this point I want, however, to point out that the eugenic logic 
refers not merely to the eugenic ideology of a particular historical time, but precisely to 
the persistent view of disability that emerged with the eugenic movement, which 
5 
core of this thesis. This is exemplified not least through the practice of 
prenatal testing and selective abortion, which reveals that the birth of a 
disabled child is commonly seen as the ultimate sign of catastrophe. It 
is revealed on a structural level in society, in dominant systems of 
representation, and in the cultural narratives that not only shape the 
material world but inform our human relations and shape the sense of 
who we are. It is revealed in the discourse about reproductive health in 
which it is apparent that a mother with disabilities per definition is 
viewed as an unfit mother. And the very same eugenic logic can also be 
found in the Christian tradition; particularly in the most common 
criteria for being created in God’s image, which is the ability to reason. 
In all of these, in some sense separate discourses, one thing stands out 
as a common denominator, namely that disability is placed outside of 
notions of normality, outside of what is desired. Especially vulnerable 
to such marginalization are people with profound intellectual 
disabilities. 
I could have followed through with my initial plan to critically 
analyze a couple of bioethical theories and constructively articulate a 
viable alternative position on prenatal testing. This would have been a 
well-motivated task because of the rapid emergence of new biomedical 
technologies, such as new elevated methods for prenatal screening, 
which surely raises many questions about how and on what grounds 
we are to make use of such technologies within health care today. 
However, the many stories of people with disabilities evoked me to 
take a different route. In one of the books that has had immense 
influence on my research, Feminist Disability Studies (2011), Alison Kafer 
writes:  
 
There are stories of people embracing their bodies, proudly 
proclaiming disability as sexy, powerful, and worthy; tales of 
disabled parents and parents with disabled children refusing to 
accept that a bright future for our children precludes disability and 
asserting the right to bear and keep children with disabilities; and 
narratives of families refusing to accept the normalization of their 
bodies through surgical interventions and the normalization of their 
desires through heterocentric laws and homophobic condemnations. 
                                                     
makes sense of and legitimizes marginalisation of people with disabilities. See Garland-
Thomson 2012; Grue 2010.  
6 
These stories deserve telling, and the issues they raise demand 
debate and dissent.3  
 
A common approach within feminist theory is to embrace voices 
from the margins in theory. Feminist theologian Karin Sporre (1999) 
discusses this as a calibration of ethical priorities between voices or 
perspectives. She proposes:  
 
[W]e can make a choice, we can choose to act, so that the one who is 
designated inferior or subordinate to us can have an interpretative 
privilege. We would then have an obligation to listen while that 
person, she or he, talks and gives word to personal experience, 
perspectives and knowledge of a particular societal practice. We can 
listen, and the one to whom we listen may through the attention 
receive a face.4  
 
This dissertation is about giving people with disabilities a face, and 
it is an invitation to imagine the world differently. The life stories of 
people with disabilities have revealed to me that disability is truly 
everywhere in culture as both a generative concept and a fundamental 
human experience, and therefore I believe that disability has an 
important meaning-making and knowledge-producing potential. I 
believe that before we go into further ethical analyses of practices or 
ideologies that serve to uphold a eugenic logic, we need to have faces 
on those who are most vulnerable to become the victims of such logic.  
1.2 How to Speak of Those who cannot Speak?  
While it is true that the people with disabilities have been my greatest 
inspiration for writing this thesis, it is also true that the very same 
people are the reason to why I have struggled greatly with my choice 
of a career in a highly intellectual milieu. More than once have I thought 
to myself: what good can writing about these people do and who am I 
to do so? Who am I to suggest that a good life is not depending on the 
ability to reason?  How could I suggest that communication goes far 
                                                     
3 Kafer 2011, 237.  
4 Sporre 1999, 535. 
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beyond words, when my own success is dependent on my ability to 
write? How can I propose that an unorthodox body with chronic pain 
can teach us something important about human existence, when I have 
a highly functioning and painless body myself?  
Nevertheless, the stories about the people that have both touched 
my heart profoundly and triggered my philosophical thoughts are not 
familiar to all. Along the way I have heard countless times: “This is so 
exciting. You need to write about this. It needs to be heard!”5 Stanley 
Hauerwas, whose theological thinking has been greatly inspired by 
people with disabilities, has many times decided to stop writing on the 
subject of intellectual disability.6 Reflecting on this he says:  
 
People who really care about the mentally handicapped never run 
out of things to say, since they do not write “about” the mentally 
handicapped precisely because they do not view the mentally 
handicapped as just another “subject.” They write for and, in some 
sense, with the mentally handicapped. To be able to write for and 
with the mentally handicapped requires that you know people who 
are mentally handicapped. By “know” I mean you must be with the 
handicapped in a way they may be able to claim you as a friend.7  
 
In this quote Hauerwas captures my own ambition: my wish is to 
write this thesis with those friends of mine who have not got a voice of 
their own – especially not in the academic context. I have found in the 
philosophical, ethical and theological literature disturbing accounts of 
disability. Many negative positions on intellectual disability have been 
formed in the absence of any representation either by people with 
disabilities or by their families and friends and found their way into 
health care and policy decisions through the field of bioethics,8 and one 
of the purposes in this thesis is to point at the devastating consequences 
of such positions. If I, who know people with disabilities, do not write 
about/with them, then who will? 
There are challenges, however, in such a project, and to avoid some 
of the pitfalls one has to take some precautions. Eva F. Kittay (2010) has 
                                                     
5 The beautiful Norwegian words of my college Anne Marie Rösting Strand are forever 
etched in my mind: “Det trenger å bli hørt.”   
6 Hauerwas 2004, 13. 
7 Hauerwas 2004, 13. Italics in the original.  
8 Kittay 2010, 397.  
8 
identified two of these as epistemic responsibility: know the subject that 
you are using to make a philosophical point; and epistemic modesty: 
know what you do not know.9 While there is a risk in actually knowing 
your subject, either by familial bonds or through friendship, that the 
philosophical conclusions are in some sense blurred by the personal 
engagement, one can wonder what the alternative is. One example can 
be drawn from an article on speciesism and moral status, written by 
Peter Singer (2010), in which he considers the views of parents to 
children with intellectual disabilities on his proposal of a graduated 
view of the moral status of humans and nonhuman animals. He 
demonstrates only two examples of which one is optimistic, the parents 
praise the characteristics of their son with Down syndrome, and one 
which is negative and the parents in hindsight would have chosen not 
to intubate their disabled son at a point when they did have the choice 
to keep him alive or let him die.10 Singer concludes: 
 
I don’t have enough data to venture a conclusion as to which view is 
the more prevalent among parents of children with disabilities, and 
even if I did, that would not resolve the ethical question one way or 
another. Rather, we should consider parental choice as a factor in its 
own right, and one that ought to have an important role in decisions 
about whether to prolong life or whether to end it.11 
 
In Singers writing, there is a strong presupposition that people with 
intellectual disabilities are non-persons because of their presumed 
lacking ability to reason, but for anyone who actually knows people 
with intellectual disabilities it is quite obvious that he knows little about 
these people. His empirical examples do no hold up.12 And if this, as in 
the example above, is the best he can do to take into consideration the 
actual experiences of others there is a level of arrogance in his argument 
that is far worse, in my opinion, than being too close with the subject of 
philosophy. In his account the epistemic responsibility is truly far 
away.  And what is equally bad in the argumentation of Singer is that 
                                                     
9 Kittay 2010, 401. In article 4 I elaborate on the concept of epistemic modesty in a 
discussion about the meanings of being created in God’s image.   
10 Singer 2010, 340-341. 
11 Singer 2010, 341. 
12 Kittay 2010, 402-403. 
9 
he does not acknowledge his own ignorance. As Kittay points out: 
“they do not know what they do not know, nor do they appear to take 
any concrete steps to rectify the situation, because they presume that 
they have nothing to learn that is of moral significance.”13 
It is important here to note the nature of the questions posed. If one 
is to make moral statements concerning people with disabilities, then 
one has the responsibility to pay attention to the people with disabilities 
and the people who know them. While the question of who is entitled 
to write on the issue of disability has been one of the key questions 
within disability studies,14 one does have to recognize that dealing with 
different intellectual concepts and ideas demands a certain level of 
cognitive ability to provide ethically and philosophically sound views. 
Individuals with (profound) intellectual disabilities simply lack the 
necessary competence to do so.15 While such a statement might sound 
harsh, I believe the more important question is exactly how research on 
the issue of disability should be done.  
Traditionally disability research has been part of the problem of dis-
crimination and oppression, which, as Simo Vehmas (2002) suggests, 
has promoted the problem rather than solved it. He explains this to be 
due to the fact that the research has been conducted by people who 
have the power, that is people who are nondisabled, over those who do 
not, that is people with disabilities. If one is to break this oppressive 
tendency, one has to place oneself as a researcher to the service of 
disabled people.16 Vehmas asserts: 
 
Researchers should thus adopt an emancipatory research paradigm 
which requires, for example, the adoption of a social model of 
disablement as the epistemological basis for research production, 
undertaking such a research that will be of practical benefit to the 
self-empowerment of disabled people, and developing control over 
research production to ensure full accountability to disabled people 
and their organisations.17 
 
                                                     
13 Kittay 2010, 405; See also Vehmas 2002, 21.  
14 See The Academic Context. 
15 Vehmas 2002, 21.  
16 Vehmas 2002, 21-22. 
17 Vehmas 2002, 22. 
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Hence, academics should join people with disabilities in their 
struggles to confront and overcome the oppression they face. I will 
return to the methodological considerations later in this chapter and in 
more depth reflect upon the ways in which I have tried to conduct my 
research in a respectful and meaningful way for people with 
disabilities. 
Lastly, as will become apparent in this thesis, the issue of who is disa-
bled is entangled with the question of how to speak of people with disa-
bilities as well. While the emergence of the social model of disability 
has been crucial in reimagining disability identity itself, the sometimes 
rigid rejections of disability identity and/or the social and political 
narratives of disability risk losing track of practices and narratives that 
reimagine disability as an occasion for demanding equal access to 
inclusion and participation in society.  Even though it will be argued in 
this thesis that the category disabled needs to be rethought, it needs also 
to be recognized that the political category of disability, as it functions 
in society today, ignores the reality that most people with disabilities 
who identify or are identified as disabled are excluded from life-
sustaining and life-giving resources in the social and institutional 
spheres. People with disabilities can but do not necessarily suffer more 
from their disability than any other people do in general, but the 
conditions for human suffering are increased when people do not have 
the resources they need.18  
Hence, viable moral reflection on the issue of disability can thus re-
quire one to, on the one hand, be with the disabled, and help the world 
accept the disabled on the other. I will conclude this section with a 
quote by Kittay in which she reflects on her dual role of a philosopher 
and mother of a daughter with multiple disabilities: 
 
My daughter, Sesha, will never walk the halls of academe, but when 
what happens within these halls has the potential to affect her, then 
I as an academic have an obligation to socialize academe to accept 
my daughter.19   
  
As I think of the horrible destinies some of my disabled friends have 
experienced, I cannot keep silent. I can, and should, continue to be with 
                                                     
18 Hauerwas 2004, 19-20; Garland-Thomson 2014.  
19 Kittay 2010, 398. 
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them, but I am also obliged to do what I can to change such future 
destinies. I believe I can and should speak for those who cannot speak.  
1.3 The Research Field 
The issue of disability has thus far primarily been discussed within the 
social sciences, and the nature of the research has been mostly 
empirical. In the anthology Arguing about Disability (2009) it is pointed 
out that even though most of the research on disability has been 
conducted within a sociological framework, the social theory of 
disability still remains insufficient. Among philosophers, on the other 
hand, disability has mainly been discussed in relation to issues of 
abortion, euthanasia and justice. Although this thesis falls under the 
traditional philosophical topics as well, I have wanted to take into 
account the lack in many philosophical accounts of disability, namely 
the larger contextual factors, such as social, cultural and theological 
aspects. Hence, it appears as if disability studies research lacks essential 
dimensions of the complexity of the phenomenon of disability, while 
philosophers have frequently ignored the empirical realities and facts 
about disability, which in both cases has tended to stereotype disability 
in certain ways. This means that progressive and innovative disability 
research needs to provide both descriptive and normative dimensions 
of disability.20  
Another important aspect, but sadly rather absent aspect, of 
disability research has been that of gender perspectives. Even though 
gender can be argued to be one of the most important dimensions 
influencing and shaping services and supports for people with 
disabilities, it is an aspect often unrecognized. Now, this is not only an 
issue with regards to important aspects being left out, but also about 
disability theory as such. Feminist theories have been grappling with 
                                                     
20 Vehmas et.al. 2009, 1. Though there are a few scholars who aim at providing 
philosophically and empirically sound views on disability, in the Nordic context the 
social science perspective is still the most influential. In a recent book, that entails some 
interesting and valuable contributions, the philosophical (and theological) viewpoints 
are missing. See Childhood and Disability in the Nordic Countries. Being, Becoming, 
Belonging (2015), edited by Rannveig Traustadóttir, Borgunn Ytterhus, Snaefrídur 
Thóra Egilson and Berit Berg. 
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similar issues as those concerning disability for decades and can 
therefore provide important insights, methods and perspectives to 
disability research, so that the wheel will not have to be invented all 
over again.21 Precisely for this reason I take a feminist perspective or a 
feminist approach as crucial in disability research in general, but in this 
thesis in particular.  
As for the theological study of the human condition, accounts of the 
changing and deteriorating body have been widely ignored. There is a 
prevalent perception within theological research that chronically ill and 
people with disabilities want to be cured at any cost. Furthermore, if 
one takes a look at the Bible and much writing in the Christian tradition 
it is sometimes hard to tell the difference between how women and 
people with disabilities are spoken of. Usually the body of women have 
been viewed as corrupt and carnally evil, and because of her eating 
from the tree of knowledge, the woman is usually considered 
responsible for sickness, deformities and disease. Throughout the 
Christian tradition women have thus embodied a similar 
unwholesomeness to people with disabilities. The feminist exploration 
of power relations, and analysis of gender and sexuality, and the 
emphasis on experience-based theology is thus highly relevant for 
people with disabilities. Because there are so many disabling effects of 
patriarchy, feminist perspectives need to be actively incorporated in the 
analysis of what it means to be human, and in the discourse about 
disability. Likewise feminist theology would be more complete if it 
would analyse the disabled bodies more, because the tendency within 
both secular and theological feminism is to speak of an idealized and 
independent body, or of a too fluent gender, which risks that not all 
women (people) feel welcome in the feminist struggle for equality.22 
An issue concerning the study of biotechnologies is that theology is 
frequently regarded to not be as relevant as the natural sciences or 
applied ethics, since theology is commonly thought to have different 
aims and purposes. This is the case both within the discipline of 
theology, and outside. Within theology it is sometimes suggested that 
theological thinking is weakened by being engaged in science, and 
outside theological reflection it is sometimes regarded as second hand 
                                                     
21 Kristansen & Traustadottír 2004, 19; Garland-Thomson 2011, 13-14. 
22 Freeman 2002, 171-175; Bê 2012, 427-428; Powell 2015, 116-117. 
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knowledge.23 However, I will argue that a theological account of human 
being provides a truth-dimension to the discourse that is relevant for 
ethical considerations, and that theological ethics can provide a wider 
moral framework than that of secular ethics. Methodologically 
philosophy and theology can also bring different dimensions to the 
discourse, as they do not rely upon falsification and verification. 
Especially a narrative approach allows for the cultural dimension of 
science to enter the discourse. It can further be argued that theology 
cannot afford to ignore questions arising within the natural sciences if 
it wants to say something relevant in the scientific age of the twenty-
first century. This does not mean that theology has to be applied to 
particular issues, but the way theology emerges it needs to take the 
scientific context into consideration, just as it needs to take into 
consideration other cultural contexts such as feminism and disability.24  
What can be said, still, with regard to this study of disability is that 
even though it is a growing field of research, it remains quite small and 
fractured in the Nordic context. In Finland, which is my own specific 
context, the first professorial chair in disability studies, received by 
Simo Vehmas, was established as late as in 2013, thanks to the disability 
organizations that have funded the post at the University of Helsinki. 
This implies something about that the issue of disability has not yet 
gained as much popularity in the Nordic context as in the Anglo-
American world. While some disability research has been conducted 
previously as well, it has not been properly organized and therefore 
remained a shattered field. What remains an almost inexistent field of 
research in all the Nordic countries, however, is the intersection 
between theology, disability studies and a feminist approach,25 and a 
                                                     
23 For an interesting account of the emergence of bioethics, the jurisdictional struggle 
between science and theology, and the retreat of theologians from bioethics, see The 
History and Future of Bioethics. A Sociological View (2012) by John H. Evans.  
24 Dean-Drummond 2001, xv-xvi, 208-213. 
25 To my knowledge Linda Vikdahl, Inger Marie Lid, Arne Fritzson, Susanne Rappman 
and Björn Nalle Öhman are the only theologians in the Nordic countries who have 
explicitly written in the issue of disability from a theological perspective, but none with 
the specific focus of this thesis. Nevertheless, Öhman who wrote his doctoral thesis 
Kropp, handling och ritual. Hur förstå religion och personer med grava funktionshinder? (2008) 
at my own department of Theological ethics and philosophy of religion has greatly 
inspired my own writing, not least through his own personal commitment to working 
with and living close to people with disabilities.   
14 
specific focus on people with profound intellectual disabilities.26 Therefore 
this thesis is intended to fill some of this void. In the chapter The 
Academic Context I will more extensively present the main 
characteristics of the fields that I take this thesis to be a contribution to. 
1.4 Purpose of the Study and Task(s)  
Much of our physical, social and cultural sphere is designed in ways 
that propagate patterns of harmful exclusion27 of people with 
disabilities, not least due to the prevalent medical reductionist view of 
health and human being. The purpose of this thesis is therefore firstly 
(1) to identify such patterns of exclusion and expressions of a 
reductionist view of human being that places disability on the margins 
of humanity or mentions it merely for the purpose of defining the outer 
boundaries of anthropological definitions. Secondly (2), the purpose is 
to challenge and constructively reimagine the normative ableist concep-
tions and representations about human being that render possible 
undignified responses to people with (profound intellectual) 
disabilities.  
                                                     
26 Simo Vehmas does currently (2014-2018) lead an innovative research project, funded 
by the Academy of Finland, that is concerned with understanding the lives of people 
with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities (PIMD) in terms of well-being and 
a good life. The project is a comprehensive ethnographic study by researchers who 
either live with, or otherwise are deeply involved with people with profound 
intellectual disabilities. http://www.aka.fi/en/about-us/media/press-
releases/2014/Research-into-culture-and-society-receives-21-in-funding-from-the-
Academy-of-Finland/ 
27 In much literature the concept of exclusion is used parallel to social exclusion, which 
refers to the ways in which individuals are at risk of being cut off from full involvement 
in the wider society. An important feature of the concept of social exclusion is that it 
addresses the mechanisms of exclusion, and focuses on a broad range of factors that 
prevent individuals or groups from having the same opportunities that are accessible 
to the majority of the population. As e.g. Anthony Giddens describes social exclusion 
it does however not cover all the forms of exclusion that I discuss in this thesis, and 
therefore the concept of marginalization is sometimes used to encompass these. I here 
think of exclusion of certain perspectives in the ethical discourse, and of exclusion from 
common conceptions of human existence and experience for instance. See Giddens 
2001, 323-331. 
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The comprehensive task is to explore and analyse mainstream discourses 
about human being that tend to reduce important ethical questions to 
abstract principles and thereby discard the complex moral intuitions, 
emotions, and visions that are embedded in concrete moral situations 
in the social, cultural, political, medical and religious sphere and 
harshly marginalize different forms of lives as unworthy. In order to 
challenge normative assumptions about human being, various aspects 
of normality, health and embodiment are critically discussed, evaluated, 
and both conceptually and constructively renegotiated. Although I 
incorporate narratives of and about people with disabilities in the 
analysis, it is important to bear in mind that the task at hand is not 
empirical. The character of the task is normative in the sense that I aim 
at articulating an explicitly inclusive concept of human being and 
human dignity.  
The dissertation is divided into two parts with an additional 
appendix. Part II includes four articles that were written as 
independent articles on the concept of disability in relation to human 
being, embodiment, health and human dignity. In each article I explore 
the different themes and can be read separately. However, taken 
together they answer to the overriding purpose and task of this thesis. 
Two of the articles (1 and 2) have been published prior to dissertation, 
while the other two (3 and 4) are reviewed and accepted for publication 
in 2017. The articles employ different reference systems and different 
forms of spelling due to preferences of the publishers and editors. Since 
article 4 is originally written in Swedish, the appendix entails a 
translation into English.  
In Part I the interdisciplinary academic context and the 
methodological considerations are outlined, after which I discuss four 
cultural narratives that I have identified as harmful patterns of exclusion. 
In these narratives I also point at a counter-narrative that is key in my 
constructive task. In the discussion of these narratives I have 
incorporated the main points of the individual articles. At the end of 
Part I, a final chapter with a concluding discussion of the main 
questions and arguments is posed, and lastly some prospects for future 
research are highlighted. In the following the secondary tasks of this 
thesis will be presented in the order that the articles occur.    
Article 1 has the title “Disturbing bodies. Reimagining comforting 
narratives of embodiment through feminist disability studies,” in 
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which I discuss and challenge the cultural narrative – the normalcy 
narrative – that makes the able-bodied, rational, male subject the 
normative standard in society. More precisely the task is to critically 
discuss how the normalcy-narrative has worked as a motif for social 
marginalization and oppression through e.g. selective abortion, 
eugenic programs and sexual violence, and I propose a counter-
narrative of embodiment that can work to widen imaginations of “the 
normal body”.  
In article 2 with the title “Theology as a liberating gatekeeper of 
reproductive health. Towards a relational conception of health through 
critical reflection on ableism” the aim is to, from a theological 
perspective, discuss the concept of reproductive health. The task is 
firstly to problematize the conventional medical understanding of 
health in the Western context, and secondly to widen this view by 
combining the insights from theological hermeneutics and so called 
experience-based narratives about mothers with disabilities.  
In article 3 with the title “The invisible made visible? The ethical 
significance of befriending people with disabilities” I discuss the 
practice of prenatal diagnosis in the Nordic countries in light of the 
question about what it means to be a human being with intellectual 
disabilities. The purpose is to show how the introduction and 
implementation of prenatal testing is fraught with expressions of a 
narrow and capacity-oriented view of human being, and how widening 
this view is crucial in the striving for an inclusive society where all 
people are perceived to be of equal worth. With the goal of reaching a 
widened understanding of human being as well as morality, I contrast 
the narrative of prenatal testing with one about befriending people 
with disabilities as manifested in the international organization of 
L’Arche.  
Article 4 with the title ”Det är gott att du finns. Människovärde, Guds 
avbild och människor med grava kognitiva funktionsnedsättningar” 
(”It is good that you exist. Human dignity, the image of God and people 
with profound intellectual disabilities”), is about reclaiming relevance 
in the principle of human dignity as based on the idea that human 
beings are created in God’s image by approaching it as a value 
commitment. The task is to present a theological constructive argument 
based on experience-based narratives about profound intellectual 
disabilities, described in light of the Christian narrative of creation in 
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order to achieve a relevant concept of the principle of human dignity 
on both a conceptual and a practical level. 
1.5 Methodological Considerations 
Thus far I have touched upon some of the problematic issues that occur 
in the theoretical battlefield of disability, theology, and ethics. Already 
the outline of the purpose and task reveals some of the methodological 
considerations in this thesis, since the implementation of various 
methods and approaches are viewed as an essential part of the research 
task as such – not least the incorporation of experience-based narratives 
in the theoretical analysis. I have, however, not collected these 
narratives through empirical studies, such as interviews or 
ethnographic studies, but they are already documented narratives of 
and about people with disabilities obtained from different sources. 
Note also that the theoretical analysis refers to specifically an ethical 
analysis since this is a dissertation in theological ethics. This means that 
the methodological considerations concern questions regarding the 
moral sphere of human life. I do not ascribe myself to any specific 
ethical theory or any single method. Instead I want to make room for 
different moral intuitions, and propose the talk of the right, the good 
and the meaningful, and by descriptive interpretations propose a view 
that can impact on people’s thinking and actions,28 as well as theories 
on disability. An important feature of this enquiry is the argument that 
integrating disability as a category of analysis and as a system of 
representation will widen, challenge and transform assumptions and 
values in the intersecting research fields this thesis concerns.29 In the 
following chapter I will present the broader academic context and the 
intersecting research fields, while in the present chapter I will outline 
the key theoretical premises.  
                                                     
28 See Kurtén 2016, 11-37, in particular 34-36. 
29 Sporre 1999, 34-37; Garland-Thomson 2011, 15. 
18 
1.5.1 A disability hermeneutic of human being 
An important question in this thesis is: what does it mean to be human? 
This question has been widely discussed within ethics, philosophy, 
theology, medicine etc. The answer to such a question will inevitably 
rely on what view one has on human being. In light of the purpose of 
this thesis an important methodological consideration is to decide on a 
solid theoretical platform that distances itself from a reductionist view 
of human being. However, as Ragnar Holte (1984) proposes, there is a 
relevant distinction between methodological reduction and ontological 
reduction, of which the latter refers to the claim of being able to describe 
and explain a phenomenon, such as human being, completely. In this 
thesis disability is never understood as an ontological category and 
therefore any ontological reduction must be rejected. The former on the 
other hand, methodological reduction, implies that one recognizes that 
an issue can never be completely resolved since different perspectives 
will lead to different outcomes. The ontological reduction of human 
being actualizes the important question of what one is expecting to see 
when exploring humanity. For example the language of gender, 
nationalism or race tends to cover other deeper assumptions about the 
well-being of society being dependent on uncovering the threat that 
broken and deviant bodies and minds pose.30 Brian Brock writes: 
 
It is therefore not far-fetched that to claim that the polarity between 
the able and disabled humanity underlies the whole range of 
prejudicial attitudes that have been resisted by activists over the last 
hundred years, misogyny, racism, and nationalism being the most 
prominent views which rest on deeply held beliefs that the bodies of 
women, other races, or other cultures are somehow deficient, 
intrinsically misshapen, or lacking some basic capacities.31    
 
From a disability perspective the persistent belief that some people 
are “broken” demands that the methodology reveals and challenges 
this cultural tendency to classify some people as less human. The 
medical and psychological sciences have established their definitions 
as default accounts of the category of disability and therefore the 
                                                     
30 Brock 2012, 1-2; Holte 1984, chapter 3, especially 43-46. 
31 Brock 2012, 2. 
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strategy is to read beneath, between, and against the ableist 
assumptions that underlie such anthropologies. Though there might be 
other hermeneutic tools that could reveal important aspects of human 
being, I have throughout the four articles applied what might be called 
a disability hermeneutic, which means that the analysis takes its starting 
point in the human experience of disability.32   
While this thesis is formally conducted within the department of 
systematic theology it is however important to note that much 
disability theology is described as practical theology, or at least 
resonates with the general ethos of practical theological enquiry. 
Disability theology is also contextual to the extent that it emerges from 
theological reflection on the specific form of human experience that is 
the experience of disability. Furthermore, because disability theology 
entails the task of challenging the able-bodied hermeneutic that has 
guided theological thinking through the whole Christian tradition, and 
because the Church in her theology has been largely influenced by the 
values that spring from dominant cultures, a hermeneutic of suspicion33 is 
guiding the enquiry of the disability hermeneutic. The purpose of 
applying a disability hermeneutic is thus about expanding normative 
accounts of human being, but also to place disability at the very centre 
of the anthropological, ethical and theological enquiry so that the 
question does not remain merely about inclusion but about the 
centrality of people with disability in theory and practice. On the other 
hand one must be careful too to not objectify people with disabilities by 
assigning them a categorical theological function that highlights the 
general limitation for human being.34 Elizabeth L. Antus asserts: 
 
The task ahead for Christian theologians interested in reworking 
theological anthropology centered around disability will be able to 
listen and revise, all the while remaining comfortable with the 
indeterminacy and messiness of overcoming best-case 
anthropologies.35 
 
                                                     
32 See part I and II in Yong 2007; Swinton 2011a, 264.  
33 The phrase hermeneutics of suspicion is originally coined by Paul Riceour and is about 
attempting to decode obvious or self-evident meanings that are hidden or unflattering.  
34 Swinton 2011b, 273-277; Antus 2013, 244-246, 61. 
35 Antus 2013, 261. 
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Hence, the first premise for the analyses in this thesis is a disability 
hermeneutic, but in order to avoid the risk of objectifying people with 
disabilities the second methodological consideration concerns the 
usage of experience-based narratives or personal narrative stories.  
1.5.2 Personal narrative stories and the feminist approach 
In the Background I suggest that experience-based narratives about 
people with disabilities and encounters with them are used in this 
thesis as both a material and a methodological resource. This means 
that the narratives on the one hand are used as data about human being 
intended to capture personal and human dimensions of experience. On 
the other hand, the stories are used as a narrative analysis method, which 
means that the analysis occurs throughout the research process, rather 
than being a separate activity carried out after the data collection. It can 
also be pointed out that narratives are used on two separate levels. 
Experience-based narratives inform the analysis, but it is the cultural 
narratives that I argue can be reimagined through personal stories. 
There are many different approaches to narrative studies, 
depending on the analytic strategy and/or form, of which biography, 
autobiography, life stories, and personal experience stories are a few 
examples.36 Since people with profound intellectual disabilities is a 
group of particular interest in this thesis, I have had to rely upon the 
stories about them told by those who live close to them.37 Venla 
Oikkonen (2013) suggests one fruitful method of narrative analysis to 
be one that captures the rocky road between structure and context, and 
she argues that narrative analysis in this sense differs from other 
methods of analysis, such as discourse analysis. Whereas discourse 
refers to the specific vocabularies through which we make sense of the 
world, narrative covers both the vocabularies in narratives and the 
                                                     
36 Drummond & Brotman 2014, 537.  
37 In En gåtfull verklighet (2000), Ragnar Furenhed tries to give answers to how it is 
possible to communicate with and about people with profound disabilities, and 
articulate something significant about their lives and their life quality. Through 
interviews with parents and care takers he shows in a most respectful way that it is 
possible to say something about such lives, although it involves the risk of 
misinterpretation.   
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underlying logic of those narratives.38 Naturally, the choice of 
narratives are in the hands of the narrator and researcher, and therefore 
reveal something about the character and context of the researcher as 
well.39 
Hence, the choice to incorporate narratives as a methodological 
resource is firstly (1) connected to what I have previously referred to as 
epistemic responsibility. In much moral philosophical and ethical 
research that dominates the field, people with disabilities are excluded 
from theory. While many of these theoretical approaches are useful 
tools in various ethical situations, I argue that the boundaries of ethical 
considerations must go beyond discussions of rights, utility and 
capacities in order to respond properly to the issue of disability and 
dignity. The absence of a disability perspective in ethical theory points 
at the need for a certain kind of academic activism. What this implies 
methodologically can be referred to as a “methodology of intellectual 
tolerance,” which means the intellectual position of tolerating what 
previously has been regarded incoherent. This method allows conflict 
and contradiction, it does not avoid difficult questions and it accepts 
provisional answers. It seeks equality but claims difference. The 
method of intellectual tolerance writes new stories and recovers 
traditional ones, and in this endeavor the experience of disability is 
crucial.40 To use experience-based narratives is thus a methodological 
tool for practicing a responsible ethical analysis of disability and as an 
expression for academic activism.  
 Feminist theorists have long proposed a strong critique of the mind-
body dichotomy and the intellectual disparagement of the body that 
are both prevalent in the history of Western thought, which highlights 
the importance of transcending the body. Feminists have also argued 
that the dominant forms of Christian theology have strengthened 
ancient views of the body by representing the body as a major source 
of the desires and weaknesses that lead to sin, and overcoming the body 
as an essential ingredient in moral perfection. What feminist theory has 
not done, however, is to recognize that much of the appeal of 
philosophies of life recommends that some form of transcendence of 
                                                     
38 Oikkonen 2013, 297-298. 
39 See Morberg Jämterud 2016, 43. 
40 Keith & Keith 2013, chapter 6; Garland-Thomson 2011, 40-42. 
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the body lies in the rational desire to make one’s happiness, or at least 
one’s sense of self, independent of illness, pain, and weakness. The 
reason for this is proposed, by e.g. Susan Wendell, one of the first to 
theorize on feminism and disability, to be due to feminist writing 
distancing itself from the negative body.41  
Hence, the second (2) argument for implementing experience-based 
narratives as a methodological resource springs from the growing 
interdisciplinary field of feminist disability studies in which a number 
of scholars focus particularly on disabled women’s experiences. A 
feminist disability approach fosters complex understandings of the 
cultural history the body, and by analyzing the ability/disability system 
it goes beyond explicit disability topics such as illness, health, eugenics, 
reproductive technologies etc. The feminist disability approach has 
revealed that disabled women are often in a disadvantaged position to 
both disabled men and non-disabled women, and that their experiences 
have remained largely invisible. Neither has the perspective of disabled 
women been properly attended to in either the women’s movement or 
the disability movement.42 The feminist disability approach thus 
reveals both the importance of cross-breeding feminist and disability 
concerns and the importance of attending to stories rarely heard.  
The feminist narrative analysis method is characteristically reflexive 
in that it requires from the researcher to engage in the material 
resources and in the analytic processes in a transformative way. In a 
sense one could say that the researcher joins the subjects in the stories 
in a process called “restorying.” As Drummond & Brotman (2014) point 
out: “the act of “restorying” requires an acknowledgement of the 
participation of the researcher in the creation of the research.”43 The 
approach thus involves reflexivity, which can be understood as an 
awareness of oneself acting in the social world. This approach is 
somewhat similar to the approach among so called “I-Thou-
philosophers,” who explore human existence from the standpoint of 
dialogical relationships.44  In the context of feminist-informed research 
                                                     
41 Wendell 1996, 165-166.  
42 Bê 2012, 363; Wendell 1996, 5; Garland-Thomson 2011, 16; See also chapter Disability 
Studies. 
43 Drummond & Brotman 2014, 537.  
44Holte 1984, 73-74; Buber 1994; Illman 2004. While Martin Buber is internationally the 
most influential philosopher of dialogical relationships, in the Nordic (Swedish) 
23 
methodology, however, the notion of reflexivity is primarily used to 
address the role of the researcher within the research process and urges 
for a critical reflection upon the very nature of the research. The 
feminist approach emphasizes the collaborative, non-exploitative 
relationship with the subjects in the narratives greatly.45  
The experience-based narratives of people with disabilities reveal 
that the truth about disability is not found primarily in theories, but in 
various descriptions of experience, whether found in blogs, 
newspapers, autobiographies, or in conversations with people with 
disabilities or those who live close to them.46 None of the four articles 
have been written without a narrative methodology, and by combining 
my own personal stories with the stories told by others, the act of 
“restorying” has required a consistent reflexive approach. At several 
occasions I have had to distance myself from personal opinions and 
experiences, in order to stay true to the stories told. From a research-
ethical point of view it has also been of importance to not use personal 
stories for uses they were not intended. Both article 1 and 3 include 
personal stories of mine, but they are used for the purpose of 
introducing the reader to the theme of the article, not for analytical 
purposes. I argue that the incorporation of these stories is vital to any 
research that concern ethical, philosophical or theological questions 
about reproductive technologies or human being itself, and in this 
particular thesis they are vital for the description of the greater cultural 
narratives of normalcy, parenthood, dignity and friendship.   
1.5.3 God-talk and human experience 
An important issue in theological ethics today is the question of the 
religious versus the secular. Tage Kurtén (2016) writes: 
 
                                                     
context John Cullberg is a largely ignored theologian of the twentieth century who 
emphasized the dialogical thinking in theology. One study that has actualized 
Cullberg’s thinking in our age is Robert Lemberg in Jag, Du och Verkligheten (2000). 
45 Drummond & Brotman 2014, 537. 
46 Cf. Wendell 1996, 7. 
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In the search for a rational, common for all humankind, basis for 
ethics much of modern moral philosophy imagines the foundation 
for the common for all humankind to be non-religious, as secular.47 
 
It has been argued that religious foundations for morality have in 
modernity become highly exclusive of people who do not consider 
themselves religious, and it has been argued that a secular point of view 
would be more “neutral” in moral deliberations. However, while 
religious foundations are indeed laden with ideological content, so too 
is the secular, Kurtén asserts. From the perspective of the Christian 
narrative of creation, the religious can be argued to be common for all 
humankind since God, according to this narrative, has induced the 
whole creation and thus all human beings with a common morality. In 
this line of thinking ethics and moral considerations are beyond the 
religious and the secular, and this enables a holistic thinking that allows 
us to hope for a mutual agreement between people about the good, the 
right and the meaningful, if we are only willing to listen to each other’s 
viewpoints.48  
In this thesis (especially in article 2 and 4) so called God-talk is 
highly relevant, and in light of Kurtén’s account above, God-talk can be 
understood as the talk about human life and human nature. Following 
the feminist theological tradition I view human experience as essential 
to any talk about God. Despite vast suspicion against feminist theology 
that draws on women’s experience as a basic source of content and 
criterion for truth, human experience can be said to be both the starting 
point and ending point for all hermeneutic reflection. The early feminist 
theologian Rosemarie Radford Ruether namely claims both Scripture 
and the Christian tradition to be codified by collective human 
experience. Experience thus includes experience of the divine, of 
oneself, of the community and the world in an interacting dialectic. She 
further proclaims that the uniqueness of feminist theology is not really 
about experience as such, but about its use of particularly women’s 
experience, which has been almost entirely ignored in much theological 
reflection. The use of women’s experience is therefore first and 
foremost a critical force, as Radford Ruether puts it, exposing classical 
                                                     
47 Kurtén 2016, 30. Translation my own. 
48 Kurtén 2016, 33-34. 
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theology and its codified traditions as based on male experience, rather 
than on universal human experience.49     
To challenge previous accounts, feminist theologians have 
developed a critical principle which suggests: 
 
Whatever denies, diminishes, or distorts the full humanity of women 
is, therefore, appraised as not redemptive. Theologically speaking, 
whatever diminishes or denies the full humanity of women must be 
presumed not to reflect the divine or an authentic relation to the 
divine, or to reflect the authentic nature of things, or to be the 
message or work of an authentic redeemer or a community of 
redemption.50   
 
While such a principle is not new within Christian theology, the 
uniqueness of the feminist account lies in that women claim the 
principle for themselves – they claim themselves to be subjects of 
authentic and full humanity. As the male human experience has been 
the norm for authentic humanity, women have been condemned for sin 
and marginalized in both original and redeemed humanity, and this is 
argued to have distorted the theological paradigm of imago Dei – the 
idea of human beings as created in the image of God. When the image 
of God is based on male humanity against or above women, the whole 
idea of imago Dei becomes an instrument for oppression rather than 
redemption and liberation.51  Radford Ruether underlines that the 
critical principle of feminist theology need not only challenge the male 
dominion, but reach for an inclusive concept of human being that 
affirms the humanity of all genders, social groups and ethnicities – and 
although not mentioned, I would add people with various abilities as 
well. The critical principle of feminist theology is thus at the core of 
God-talk in this dissertation, and the key for keeping together God-talk 
and human experience is argued to be a focus on some elements that are 
crucial to human beings. By exploring important elements in human 
life, I believe we can make sense of God-talk.52  
                                                     
49 Radford Ruether 1983, 12-13; See also Beattie 2006. 
50 Radford Ruether 1983, 18-19.  
51 The issue of imago Dei is extensively discussed and problematized in article 4.  
52 Radford Ruether 1983, 18-20; Henriksen 2014, 13. Henriksen further articulates six (a-
f) normative guidelines for understanding the relation between God-talk and human 
experience on pp. 13-14. 
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Therefore I suggest that the conditions for speaking about God are 
given along with the existential and experiential conditions of being 
human. To speak about God is however to speak about much more than 
a personal experience of the world: it is speaking about the world from 
a specific perspective that I argue can provide increased understanding 
and orientation in life, and it can help make sense of human experience. 
While a religious basis for morality can be understood as exclusive, I 
do, in line with Jan-Olav Henriksen (2014) maintain that it is the task of 
theologians to at least try to make sense of Christian beliefs to those 
who would not consider themselves religious.53 In a recent article he 
further proposes that religion should be treated as a cultural resource 
that “contributes to specific practices, which primarily enable personal 
orientation and transformation,”54 and he argues that such a view of 
religion can further serve to challenge the widespread notion in the 
Nordic countries that religion is primarily a question about belief, 
which is a position that usually addresses religion as a cognitive 
proposition.55  
 I will thus argue in this thesis that a theological account of human 
being and morality that take the critical principle of feminist theology 
into account can enable a vision for more inclusion, more justice, more 
liberation, and perhaps most importantly a more solidary world. Now, 
against the presentation of the disability hermeneutic it is also clear that 
God-talk in this thesis will be explored from the particular perspective 
of the human experience of disability. By bringing these two 
perspectives together I wish to on the one hand strengthen the 
constructive arguments in this thesis and highlight the common 
ground I have found between a feminist and a disability perspective.  
  
  
                                                     
53 Henriksen 2014, 14-17. 
54 Henriksen 2016, 37. 
55 Ibid.  
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2 The Academic Context 
In the chapter Methodological Considerations I have proposed that I adopt 
an explicit disability perspective in the theological and ethical analysis. 
By doing so I have at the same time situated this thesis in a borderland 
between broadly three different research fields. Hence, the academic 
context for the thesis can be said to unfold in a triangular framework of 
disability studies, disability theology and reproductive ethics.  
In the first part of this chapter I will give an outline of disability 
studies, in particular the approaches that I have found plausible for the 
specific context that I am situated in, and for the questions posed in this 
thesis. Since a distinct disability perspective is found too in theological 
research and in bioethics, particularly reproductive ethics, I will then 
describe some of the characteristics of disability theology, and 
reproductive ethics that are relevant for my aims.    
2.1 Disability Studies 
Disability studies is a multidisciplinary field of inquiry designed to 
study disability as a social, political and cultural phenomenon. The 
origins of disability research can be traced back to the organizations of 
people with disabilities who raised their voices in the late 1960´s 
together with other previously excluded groups, such as minority 
ethnic groupings, women, and lesbians and gay men. What disability 
activists in the US, the UK, Scandinavia and other Westerns countries 
wanted was a change in the way disability was understood, from an 
individual medical problem to a political one. The most important goal 
of this movement was that disability should no longer be viewed as a 
personal problem of the individual’s body in need of cure by health and 
social care professionals, but as a politically and socially constructed 
problem with focus on the disabling barriers faced by people with 
impairments. From its political and early theoretical formulations in the 
late 1960´s and early 1970´s it is today regarded as an academic 
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discipline in its own right with established research programs 
worldwide, and with several international academic journals.56   
The development of the discipline has generally three key elements: 
1) the idea that disabled people are a marginalized and disadvantaged 
part of the population; 2) the idea that disabled people is a minority 
group in society, and 3) the idea that disability should be articulated as 
a social rather than a medical problem. The third point is what has 
become termed the social model of disability, in which disability is 
described as a social discrimination rooted in institutional, personal 
and interpersonal processes of exclusion and oppression.57 
Because of its close connection to people with disabilities and their 
political movements and organizations, and by moving between 
various disciplines, disability studies has today become an arena for 
international and multidisciplinary research. The emergence of this 
field has not only posed an intellectual challenge to the way disability 
has been understood, but has too resulted in the establishment of a 
whole new paradigm around disability. The ideas that have grown out 
of disability studies have together with disability activism impacted 
largely on the work of international organizations, such as the United 
Nations (UN) and the World Health Organization (WHO), and on the 
work in national governments and third sector organizations.  
As disability studies has grown, new ideas and concepts have 
emerged, both from within the discipline and from the outside, to 
challenge the key tenets of the discipline. Since the 1990´s disability 
scholars have also begun a critique from the outside of first-wave 
disability studies by pointing to the need to go beyond the initially 
frequent economistic arguments and their correctives by critically 
analysing ableist structures in society and culture, as well as normalcy 
and the construction of disabled people as categorically “other”. What 
both present scholars and first-wave scholars have in common, though, 
is the concern for the consequences of exclusionary societies and the 
impact this has on people with disabilities.58  
                                                     
56 Vehmas 2002, 12; 2009, 2; Roulstone et al. 2012, 3; Egilsson et al. 2015. 
57 Roulstone et al. 2012, 3-4.  
58 Roulstone et al. 2012, 4; Vehmas 2009, 2; Shakespeare 2010, 266-267. 
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2.1.1 The Nordic relational approach to disability 
Disability studies is a mix of many different theories and practices. The 
wide range of perspectives should not be confused with theories, but 
viewed as “particular knowledge positions from which to address and 
refute disablism.”59 Hence, the various perspectives might have similar 
goals, but take different routes depending on the context of the 
scholars. For instance, in different geographical locations very distinct 
responses have emerged. Concepts of dis/ability play a central role in 
contemporary understandings of normality, the body and intelligence, 
and it is therefore important to recognize the national and historical 
times in which new disability studies perspectives emerge. In North 
America the responses have traditionally been articulated from the 
perspective of what is known as the minority model or the cultural model. 
The former has sprung out of the American Black civil rights and queer 
politics demands for raised social status, while the latter has been keen 
to connect analyses of disability studies with transformative ideas of 
feminism, queer and critical race studies. In the UK the social model 
has been dominant, whereas in the Nordic countries a wholly different 
approach has emerged.60 
The approach in Nordic disability research is commonly referred to 
as the relational model, which focuses on the relationship between the 
disabled person and the environment. The three main assumptions that 
the Nordic relational model rests on are: 1) disability is a person-
environment mismatch that occurs because the environment is not 
adapted to accommodate the whole range of people; 2) disability is 
situational or contextual, thus specific impairments can become 
disabling or not due to concrete situations; and 3) disability is relative, 
as the cut-off point in impairment-based definitions of disability is to 
some extent arbitrary. Hence, disability is understood to occur as a 
result of complex interactions between the individual and the socio-
cultural, physical, political and institutional aspects of the 
environment.61 
                                                     
59 Goodley 2011, 10. 
60 Goodley 2011, 10-16. For a more extensive account of various approaches, see Dan 
Goodley’s Disability Studies: An Interdisciplinary Introduction (2011). 
61 Mallett & Runswick-Cole 2014, 20-21; Outside the Nordic context there are scholars 
who have developed similar approaches and who explore disability as relational. 
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Nordic perspectives on disability have challenged the dominance of 
British-centric approaches in the global North. Characteristic for 
Nordic disability research is the interdisciplinary approach. Since the 
1950´s, the Nordic countries have expanded disability services in ways 
that are praised worldwide, and perhaps therefore Nordic disability 
scholars are less connected to the Disabled People’s Movement than 
elsewhere. Instead, disability studies is developed within the context of 
welfare policies, strongly influenced by the principle of normalisation.62 
This philosophy is aimed at promoting community participation of 
people with disabilities. The early normalisation principles informed 
the beginnings of self-advocacy, which is a movement that remains a 
strong component of Nordic disability activism today, even though the 
human rights perspective of the UN Convention of the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) (United Nations 2007) has come 
to replace the principle of normalisation as the foundation for disability 
policies and practice. Nevertheless, while it was more of a guiding 
philosophy than a service technique, normalisation can still be said to 
have marked a drastic departure in terms of professional and policy 
values with respect to, in particular, people with intellectual 
disabilities.63 
The relational approach is common in all of the Nordic countries, 
but there is no uniform Nordic understanding of disability. The Nordic 
approach is rather a family of ideas reflecting common underlying 
ideologies, principles and definitions, both in scholarship and policy. 
One important difference between the Anglo-American models and 
Nordic approaches to disability springs from the difficulties involved 
in translating the language of the social model into the Nordic 
                                                     
Jerome Bichenbach, who has been a consultant with the World Health Organization 
(WHO) on disability issues, has contributed largely to the field of disability research in 
writing about disability quality of life and the relationship between disability and 
wellbeing.  Tom Shakespeare is another established disability scholar who has written 
about disability beyond the social model in e.g. Disability Rights and Wrongs (2006). 
62 The principle of normalisation refers to the idea that disabled people should be able 
to lead “normal” lives, and instead of various special arrangements such as institutions, 
they are to be integrated into society with everyone else. During the 1970´s and 1980´s 
a significant liquidation of care-institutions took place, after which people with 
disabilities to a greater extent have access to a home of their own. For a more extensive 
account of this process, see Bengtsson 2004, 75-77; Egilson et al. 2015. 
63 Goodley 2011, 16; Bengtsson 2004, 75-76; Mallett & Runswick-Cole 2014, 20. 
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languages. The distinction between “disability” and “impairment” 
does not translate well into Nordic languages, and this linguistic 
difference has played its part in explaining why a relational model of 
disability has driven and been driven by empirical research in the 
Nordic countries. The relational model has been developed in various 
ways and is still very much under development. Nevertheless, the 
complex and situated interaction between individual aspects and the 
environment is at the heart of the Nordic understanding of disability, 
and this view is widely adopted by scholars in the Nordic countries and 
forms the underpinnings for much disability research.64  
An important context for disability research in the Nordic countries 
has been The Nordic Network on Disability Research (NNDR), 
established in 1997, which is an interdisciplinary network of 
researchers using social, historical, cultural and environmental 
approaches to disability research. The main activities of this network 
have been to organize research conferences, publish a scholarly 
journal,65 and encourage research cooperation among the Nordic 
countries, as well as to initiate and support links with international 
researchers and disability activists with similar interests.66   
One essential aspect in the activities of NNDR has been the feminist 
perspective, although few men adopt this perspective. Feminist 
research has a well-established position in the Nordic universities, and 
a feminist or gender analysis is frequently incorporated in much 
research within a variety of fields. However, despite an increasing 
emphasis on diversity in Nordic feminist thought, disability has not 
been one of the issues explored by Nordic feminists. Disability has with 
only a few exceptions been ignored by feminist researchers in the 
Nordic countries.67 Feminist disability scholars Kristjana Kristiansen 
and Rannveig Traustadóttir state:  
 
In light of feminist claims for supporting diversity, recognition of the 
importance of impairment as a part of human existence continues to 
be ignored, overlooked or dismissed by the vast majority of Nordic 
                                                     
64 Mallett & Runswick-Cole 2014, 20-21; Egilson et al 2015. 
65 Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research (SJDR) in which article 1 in thesis is 
published.  
66 Kristiansen & Traustadóttir 2004, 19; Mallett & Runswick-Cole 2014, 20. 
67 Kristiansen & Traustadóttir 2004, 20-23; see note 69. 
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feminist scholars, and disability remains invisible on the agenda in 
mainstream Nordic feminist research.68  
 
It has been argued that disability studies has failed to adequately 
theorize the experience of disability from a gendered perspective and 
that it needs to engage more with feminist perspectives. Although the 
Nordic countries have focused extensively on gender equality, only a 
few researchers have examined the intersection of gender and 
disability.69 It will be important to take gendered aspects into 
consideration in future research, such as disabled girls’ and women’s 
experiences of mothering, abuse and violence.70 This thesis should be 
viewed as a contribution to the discipline of disability studies, and in 
particular as a part of the ongoing development of the Nordic relational 
approach. My approach is however largely inspired by the cultural 
model as well, most prominently evident by my extensive use of 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s work, and because of the disturbing 
lack of recognition of important intersections between feminist and 
disability perspectives I have chosen a feminist approach in this project. 
Particularly articles 1 and 2 are contributions to this void in Nordic 
feminist research.  
2.2 Disability Theology 
Disability theology refers to the inquiry of thinking about disability in 
theological terms, or to the exploration of issues relating to disability in 
the Christian tradition and teaching. Key issues are how disability is 
understood in light of the doctrines of creation and providence, the 
person and work of Christ, humanity (theological anthropology), the 
church (ecclesiology), salvation (soteriology), and of the last things 
(eschatology). The goal in disability theology is, however, not only to 
                                                     
68 Kristiansen & Traustadóttir 2004, 21. 
69 The intersection between disability and gender has in the Nordic countries primarily 
been studied by Karin Barron, Ingunn Moses, Kristjana Kristiansen and Rannveig 
Traustadottir. For an overview of the central contributors, see Gender and Disability 
Research in the Nordic Countries (2004) by Kristiansen, Kristjana & Rannveig 
Traustadóttir. 
70 Roulstone et al. 2012, 4. 
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understand these issues, but to undertake a thorough intellectual 
conversation that challenges traditional understandings of disability.71 
There is no extensive body of literature on Christian theology and 
disability, which reflects the fact that people with disabilities have been, 
and continue to be, on the margins of society and scholarly interests. In 
this sense people who consider themselves Christian are no different 
than the rest of the society. The literature that does exist, however, 
comes mainly from North America and the UK, and much of this 
material is highly influenced by the disability-rights approach, which 
promotes equal opportunities and rights for people with disabilities. 
The aim of this research is in large to challenge and change existing 
practices in the church, but in theology as well, and a common 
assumption among these scholars is that the leading forces of the 
struggle for change are from outside the Christian community. 
Therefore, it is commonly suggested that the change must come from 
the outside as well. Hans S. Reinders points out, “[g]uided by the core 
values of liberal democracy, the disability-rights literature often 
presents “theology” and “church” as objects of resistance rather than 
agents of change.”72  
What seems to be the case among many theologians who are 
committed to the disability-rights approach is that they often forget to 
ask what a distinctively theological perspective might bring to the 
struggle for inclusion. Neither do they ask how the disability-rights 
approach relates to the basic notions and practices of the Christian 
tradition. The task of considering how concepts of the human and 
divine are formed raises important issues with regards to theological 
method. Hence, the methodology for conducting disability theology is 
of special importance.73   
People with disabilities have long had to deal with the negative 
attitudes that have been shaped by biblical references to the blind, the 
deaf, and the lame. Although the contemporary notions of disability 
would be foreign to the biblical writers, it has been an important task 
for disability theologians to challenge traditional readings of the Bible, 
as well as examine the history of the church’s beliefs and practices 
                                                     
71 Yong 2011, 5; Yong 2007, 21.  
72 Brock 2012, 1; Reinders 2008, 159-160. 
73 Reinders 2008, 160; See also Betcher 2007. 
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regarding the categories of persons today regarded as disabled – 
because these views are essentially present in much popular Christian 
imagination.74  
Disability theologian Amos Yong (2007, 2011) has identified what he 
believes are the main elements in the Christian history that continues 
to inform the theology of disability affecting not only the Christian 
communities, but the wider society as well. Such theology is 
characterized by three basic notions: 1) that disabilities are either 
ordained or permitted by God for God’s purposes, hence the view that 
there are no accidents in creation, hence the question “why me?” 2) that 
people with disabilities are encouraged to hope and trust in God’s plan 
for their lives, hence the strong belief in God’s desire to heal people 
with disabilities either in this life or in the life after this, hence the belief 
that suffering is God’s instrument that leads to repentance or nurtures 
holiness; and 3) that the church and society are to meet the needs of 
people with disabilities, hence they are viewed as recipients of divine 
favor and objects of charity.75 
These basic notions do naturally not occur in a vacuum, but are 
embedded in a culture that perpetuates the belief that some people are 
“broken” or deviant, and in which it is proclaimed that notions of 
freedom, self-determination, and equality are at the core of a just 
society, and in which normalcy is seen as a condition for citizenship. So 
while many disability theologians have aimed at re-reading and re-
telling the Christian tradition in light of contemporary notions of 
disability (usually stemming from disability studies),76 the most 
important task of disability theology today, I suggest, is the inquiry of 
what it means to be human. As I will argue in this thesis, recognizing 
people with disabilities as fully human is the basic foundation for any 
                                                     
74 Yong 2007, 20-27; Reinders 2008, 164. For an extensive account of traditional biblical 
readings of disability, as well as to common notions in tradition of the church, see PART 
I in Theology and Down Syndrome. Reimagining Disability in Late Modernity (2007) by 
Amos Yong. 
75 Yong 2007, 38-40; See also Reinders 2014; Swinton 2007.  
76 Brock 2012, 3-5; Betcher 2007, 1-24. Perhaps the most ambitious project of such an 
undertaking is the reader Disability in the Christian Tradition (2012), edited by Brian 
Brock and John Swinton, in which the authors pursue the constructive task of exposing 
and commenting on theological insights and ideas in historical scripts ranging from 
Aquinas to present day theologians with the hope of enriching contemporary thinking 
about the issue of disability. 
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plausible deliberations in ethics, anthropology and theology. Any other 
question of creation, salvation or ecclesiology, for example, relies on 
our answer to the question of human nature in relation to the divine. 
2.2.1 Theological anthropology and disability 
Theological anthropology is the study of how human being and nature 
is related to God. However, the conceptions of humanity in the field of 
theology are dependent on the methodological considerations that 
usually are driven by different moral concerns. Although the literature 
in disability theology is not extensive, Hans S. Reinders (2008) has 
managed to distinguish at least four different approaches to disability: 
“a theology of liberation,” “a theology of access,” “a theology of 
community,” and “a theology of being human.” Each of these 
approaches represents different strategies, and they all have different 
concerns.77  
The theology of liberation78 follows the paradigm of the disability-
rights approach in many ways, especially through what can be referred 
to as the anthropology of liberal citizenship. This includes the 
recognition of the lived experience of people with disabilities, a critical 
analysis of social theory of disability, and an emancipatory perspective. 
The primary concern is here to identify theoretical insights that can 
enable Christian symbols to be transformed. For this purpose, the 
minority model of disability is commonly implemented as the 
framework for theological reflection. Because of the strong focus on 
self-representation, which is a key concept in the minority model, the 
theology of liberation is lacking in relevance with regards to people 
with intellectual disabilities. However, because the social-symbolic 
order of the able-bodied are assumed to produce the inequality and 
injustice toward people with disabilities, this must be viewed as a 
necessary tool to overcome those barriers.79  
While the liberatory approach first and foremost appeals to people 
with disabilities declaring themselves a minority group within the 
                                                     
77 Reinders 2008, 160.  
78 The main character in this approach, also commonly regarded as one of the pioneers 
in disability theology in general, is Nancy Eiesland. Although not extensively, her work 
is incorporated in this thesis as well, especially in article 2 and 4.  
79 Reinders 2008, 165-167; Eiesland 1994, 19-29. 
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society as a whole, the theologies of access are more about appealing to 
religious communities as such. A concern in the access approach is also 
social justice, but the relation between subjects and objects of inclusion-
exclusion is not as noticeable. Instead they are characterized by at least 
three other features. Firstly, the emphasis is more pastoral than 
systematic, and the way of reasoning is more narrative than critically 
analytic. Secondly, biblical exegesis is important, and in particular the 
stories and passages that deal with disability as a concept or people 
with disabilities. The key task in theologies of access is to remove the 
barriers created by scriptural sources or by the ways these sources have 
been used. Third, because access is the main concern, these theologies 
are strong in offering practical suggestions and ideas for how to make 
inclusion a reality in the church.80 
The other two theological approaches to disability are slightly 
different in perspective than the former, and more in line with the 
perspectives brought forth in this thesis. On the one hand they focus 
more on intellectual disability, and on the other hand disability is not 
primarily understood as a social construct that needs to be theologically 
rethought in order to liberate people from a particular negative 
identity. The strength in these approaches is rather that intellectual 
disability is viewed as an integrated and given part of the human 
condition. In the theology of community approach, the main purpose is to 
question the belief that the existence of people with disabilities poses a 
problem to the world. Ultimately this is a critique against the liberal 
idea that we are the authors of our own lives, since in such a paradigm 
the lives of people with intellectual disabilities make little sense as fully 
human lives. Instead the analysis is built upon the idea that the 
Christian narrative shapes a society that allows us to appreciate the 
presence of people with disabilities and view all human life as a gift.81 
In the theology of human being approach, the worth of human beings 
is the main concern. The traditional way of exploring this issue is 
                                                     
80 Reinders 2008, 181-182; Yong 2011.  
81 Reinders 2008, 192-205. The theologian that most explicitly works from this 
perspective is Stanley Hauerwas, and his writings are frequently incorporated in this 
thesis. However, Hauerwas is focusing strictly on Christian communities, which I do 
not take this thesis to be limited to. For an overview of the disability theology of 
Hauerwas, see Critical Reflections on Stanley Hauerwas’ Theology of Disability (2004) edited 
by John Swinton. 
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through the doctrine of imago Dei. In the Christian context, different 
interpretations of the idea that human beings are created in God’s 
image is what makes human beings significant and valuable. In the 
theology of human being approach, a presumption is that diversity is 
inherent in the human condition and if embracing human diversity 
does not include profound intellectual disability, this must imply that 
there is a boundary precisely between what we can and what we cannot 
embrace. In the context of theology, implying a boundary to human 
diversity and presenting criteria for drawing that line implies an 
assumption about knowing what God’s will actually is. The questions 
that follow, then, are related to the issue of the worth of human being 
as such, and whether worth is grounded intrinsically or whether it 
comes from elsewhere through the care of others or through God.82   
In the concluding discussion at the end of Part I, the theology of 
human being approach might stand out as the approach that is 
primarily incorporated in the analysis in this thesis. One of the tasks set 
out is namely to capture the human condition in such a way that 
profound intellectual disability can be viewed as inherent in it. For the 
purpose of resisting the indignity and the de-humanization of people 
with profound intellectual disabilities, getting to the core of the worth 
of human being requires an analysis that rests upon embracing the 
wide diversity that exists among human beings, without presenting 
criteria for what is fully human. Nevertheless, my account should not 
be limited to the theology of community approach, nor the theology of 
human being approach, because not only is the entire field of disability 
theology quite limited, but the specific Nordic context and the Nordic 
relational model of disability is also considered as theologically 
relevant. The separate articles will therefore reveal the explorative 
character of the thesis and the different thoughts and approaches that 
have emerged along the way.  
                                                     
82 Reinders 2008, 37-38, 207-213. The main sources for this approach are referred to 
especially in article 4, in which I discuss the image of God as the basis for human 
dignity, but appear too in article 2 and 3. The two theologians that have been mostly 
influential in my work are Hans S. Reinders, John Swinton, Deborah Beth Creamer, 
Jean Vanier and Tom Reynolds.   
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2.3 Reproductive Ethics and Disability 
Since the international project to sequence the human genome, and due 
to the fast development in molecular biology, the knowledge of 
disabling conditions has expanded immensely. The technological 
revolution in the field of artificial reproduction combined with liberal 
abortion laws create the opportunity to decide if and under what 
circumstances people with disabilities come into existence. Since there 
is no cure or treatment for most disabilities, especially intellectual 
disabilities, one can argue that the ethical issues concerning 
reproductive technologies are essentially about the very lives of people 
with disabilities.83 Are we to welcome children with disabilities in this 
world? If not, why is this so? What are we to make of the information 
that genetic testing provides? Erik Parens and Adrienne Ash assert:  
 
[T]he discovery of abnormal or incorrect sequences has led primarily 
to the development of genetic tests that can reveal whether a person, 
embryo or (in the usual case) a fetus carries an abnormality or 
“mutation” associated with disease or disability.84 
 
The tests are constantly becoming more secure, profitable, and 
available to the general population.85 And as the tests become more 
easily available, so does the attitude within both the medical and the 
larger society change so that prenatal testing is viewed as a natural and 
self-evident part of good maternity care (article 3).86  
The bioethical and medical literature of the last decades shows 
evidence of misinformation and stereotypical thinking about what 
                                                     
83 Reinders 2000, 37; Parens & Asch 2000, 3.  
84 Parens & Asch 2000, 3. 
85 In article 3 the various systems of implementation in the Nordic countries will be 
discussed. Since the writing of the first article the development of the practice of 
prenatal testing has continued, and new methods and regulations have emerged. 
Particularly in Norway prenatal testing has been widely discussed since 2014. In The 
Norwegian Knowledge Centre for the Health Services research report “Non-invasive 
prenatal test (NIPT) for identification of trisomy 21, 18 and 13” (2016) the new methods 
and regulations are discussed. In the article “Non-invasive prenatal testing: a review of 
international implementation and challenges” (2015) the international implementation 
of the new non-invasive prenatal tests is further outlined.  
86 Cf. The Parenthood Narrtive. 
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disability means for individuals, families, and society. It is common 
among health professionals and bioethicists to believe that health 
status87 is what determines the chances of having a good life for people 
with disabilities, largely ignoring the role of societal factors for human 
well- or ill-being. While such a presumption might too be related to the 
fear of society not being able to adapt to and accept the presence of 
people with disabilities, it appears legitimate to suggest that the 
prevention of the lives of people with disabilities is considered morally 
good, or at least permissible, on the grounds of relieving suffering. 
Since this view has had a dominant position in informing the ethical 
debate, the tendency to withhold the wide range of questions about the 
good life for human beings has led to the conclusion that genetics and 
improved methods for screening ultimately is an issue about 
reproductive choice and freedom.88 
However, as will be problematized in this thesis, for some people 
the practice of prenatal testing is not so self-evidently good, and there 
is another story to be told. Since the early 1970’s people within the 
disability community have become more and more critical of the 
dominant medical paradigm. Through difficult struggles with health 
professionals and the surrounding communities many discovered that 
their lives changed in a positive direction once they started looking at 
themselves as human beings with gifts and potential. And so through 
the struggle for recognition of potential a new paradigm developed 
along the medical one, namely the paradigm of normalization,89 which 
enabled people with disabilities to be potential participants in social 
life. With this new paradigm the social services and caring institutions 
have changed massively in many countries, not least in the Nordic 
welfare states.90   
Despite the occurrence of the normalization paradigm that indeed 
led to increased rights and opportunities for people with disabilities, 
the implications of genetic science and technology actualizes some 
serious ethical questions for people with disabilities. How can some be 
granted new rights and opportunities, when the very same kind of 
                                                     
87 In article 2 I problematize common notions of health, and argue for a different account 
of the concept from the perspective of theology.  
88 Parens & Asch 2000, 5-8; Reinders 2000, 1-2, 21; Glover 2006, 38-43. 
89 See also The Normalcy Narrative, and articles 1 and 2.   
90 Reinders 2000, 2; Saxton 2000, 150. 
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people are to be prevented from existing? It appears as if we are 
confronted with two completely different worlds here.91 Hans S. 
Reinders highlights this controversy: 
 
The first message says: “Since you’re here, we’re going to care for 
you as best we can,” but the second says, “But everyone would be 
better off if you were not here at all.”92 
 
While these two questions are rarely part of the same discussion for 
bioethicists, there are many within the disability community who are 
worried about the relation between them. Although there is no one 
uniform position on prenatal testing in the disability community, there 
is a predominant critique against prenatal testing and selective abortion 
among these people. This critique starts with the presupposition that 
life with a disability can be valuable and valued. The disability critique 
is thus framed by two broad claims: prenatal genetic testing followed 
by selective abortion is morally problematic, and it is driven by 
misinformation. This does not necessarily imply that prenatal testing and 
selective abortion are morally wrong, but for sure that the practice is 
deceptive and need some serious questioning and discussion. Before 
moving on to some key points with regard to these claims it is worth 
mentioning that basically all the major work in the disability critique of 
prenatal testing emerges from people who are also committed to a pro-
choice, feminist agenda. Hence, the disability critique does not spring 
from a position that women should not have the right to exercise 
reproductive choice, per se. The problematic aspect is, as has been 
described in the Parenthood Narrative, that not only should women have 
the right to choose if and when, but also what kind of child they have,93 
and with the right to abortion there is a risk of women exercising this 
right in immoral ways.    
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92 Reinders 2000, 4. 
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2.3.1 The disability critique94 
The first claim about prenatal testing as morally problematic springs 
from the idea that selective abortion expresses negative or 
discriminatory attitudes about both disabling traits as such and about 
the people who carry them. This is what has come to be known as the 
expressivist argument. At the core of this argument is that the idea of 
identifying unborn children who would be disabled and choosing to 
abort them because of this identification sends a hurtful message to 
people who live with the very same traits.95 As John Swinton (2007a) 
points out, this is a very unique form of stigmatization because it is 
aimed at the ontology itself of a human being – the DNA – as opposed 
to stigma rooted in social or psychological that in principle are 
changeable.96  
Many people with disabilities experience daily how they are 
overlooked because of some single trait they bear and they worry that 
prenatal testing will repeat and reinforce the very same tendency of 
letting one trait stand in for the whole.97 Because ultimately that is what 
prenatal testing can reveal: one single (undesirable) trait, which then is 
presumed to be enough for aborting a foetus that would otherwise be 
wanted. In any other context than disability this is by most people 
found to be morally problematic. For instance, sex selection is highly 
criticized by women’s rights supporters. Hence, one of the biggest 
challenges to disability oppression is precisely that people with 
disabilities have to fight for their right to be born.98  
                                                     
94 For a comprehensive of various perspectives about the disability critique of prenatal 
diagnosis and selective abortion, see Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights (2000) edited 
by Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch. To this date this is the most comprehensive work 
on the theme.  
95 Mills 2011, 72; Parens & Asch 2000, 12-13. 
96 Swinton 2007a, 6-7; See also Saxton 2000, 160-162. 
97 In article 1 I discuss more extensively how people with disabilities have to balance 
the dual experience of constantly being both invisible and hypervisible.  
98 Mills 2011, 72-73; Parens & Asch 2000, 14; Saxton 2000, 150-151. 
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Both within and outside the disability community there are 
opposing voices towards the expressivist argument.99 Nevertheless, as 
Catherine Mills (2011) points out 
 
[I]t is worth asking whether this is in fact the appropriate register for 
the broader idea that the expressivist critique seems to grasping at, 
this is, that the social significance of prenatal testing is inseparable 
from apparatuses of discrimination against people with 
disabilities.100   
 
Discrimination is not simply a matter of individual beliefs about 
people with disabilities, but is too a matter of the conditions of truth 
production that is the very foundation for those individual beliefs 
(articles 1 and 3). The normalcy-narrative shows that modern Western 
culture is characterized by demeaning disability, which inevitably 
takes the form of discriminative practices in social, political and 
cultural life. Reasons for avoiding the birth of a disabled child involve 
passing negative judgements on lives characterized by similar traits, in 
a similar matter as decisions people make in other spheres of social life, 
intentionally or unintentionally affect other people’s lives. Therefore 
we need to ask in what ways using prenatal testing may affect the social 
position of people with disabilities.101  
 Another argument suggesting that prenatal testing is morally 
problematic is referred to as the parental attitude argument. The critique 
is posed against the parental attitude that a child can be perfected by 
their parents,102 and against the belief that prenatal testing can reveal 
what kind of child prospective parents are expecting. Essentially the 
critique is proposing that no parent can guarantee perfection for their 
                                                     
99 James Lindemann Nelson and Eva Feder Kittay can be mentioned as two scholars 
who object to the expressivist argument. For an overview over their key arguments see 
Parens & Asch 2000, 14-17; Mills 2011, 73-74. 
100 Mills 2011, 74. 
101 Mills 2011, 75; Reinders 2000, 66-67. 
102 Within ethics the new possibilities of genetic choice have led to the emergence of a 
view called procreative perfectionism or procreative beneficence, which means that 
prospective parents should aim to have children who presumably will have the best 
chance of a good human life. Commonly this argument is posed together with the 
argument of reproductive freedom. See e.g Glover 2006, 52-53; also Savulescu 2001, 413-
426.  
43 
child, disabled or not, then it would become clearer that we should turn 
our attention to attitudes about parenting instead of the disabling traits 
of the children. It is suggested that good parents would, or should, care 
about what ever child they receive. The worry is that the attitudes 
towards parenthood, and ultimately towards human beings, are 
changing through reproductive technologies like prenatal testing, and 
that children are increasingly viewed as commodities instead of gifts. 
But again, this view is not uncontested and the most important critique 
is that reproductive freedom and autonomy is of superior significance 
to whatever problematic aspects there are in parental attitudes, and that 
the issue is essentially not about perfection of the child, but about the 
potential flourishing of the child.103 
The third claim of the disability critique is that prenatal testing 
depends on misconceptions of what life is like with a child with 
disability. Connected to this claim is the question of whether disability 
can be regarded as one part of human diversity. At the core of the 
disability critique is among any other argument that the stories of 
people with disabilities are not heard in the public debate or in the 
ethical considerations.104 
Advances in genetic technology appear to bring relief from many 
forms of impairments and illnesses, and in some cases this is most 
certainly true. However, these technologies also bring with them social 
side effects that are often hidden from the public imagination, and these 
effects leave people with disabilities with questions about their own 
value, worth and dignity. Therefore reproductive technologies, such as 
prenatal testing, present great challenges to our understandings of the 
validity and authenticity of the humanness of people labelled 
disabled.105 Therefore the issue of disability should be right at the centre 
of the reproduction ethics debate. Therefore, the stories of people with 
disabilities should be heard.  
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3 The Cultural Rationale of Disability 
To most able-bodied people disability is a clear matter. A disabled 
person is someone with a dysfunctional body or mind. A disabled 
person is a special case. A disabled person is someone who is pitied. A 
disabled person is someone who able-bodied people generally feel 
awkward around, someone who makes it through life with the help of 
government funding and state services, someone few able-bodied 
persons would want to switch places with. Disability is simply an 
undesirable error in humanity.106   
People with disabilities are usually perceived as a small minority 
group in society107, which is an assumption that can easily be proven 
false e.g. by a report from the World Health Organization (2015) which 
shows that there is actually over a billion people, about 15% of the 
world's population, that have some form of disability, and another 110-
190 million adults that have significant difficulties in their bodily 
functioning.108 While such reports and statistical facts may cause a few 
to raise surprised eyebrows, they are not likely to remove the sense of 
unease people with disabilities commonly give rise to among people 
regarding themselves as normal. In fact, such reports might even 
reinforce the sense of unease. Knowing that the probability of becoming 
disabled is a real possibility for anyone might cause anxiety in a similar 
matter as the death of a close friend usually makes one think about the 
limitations in life.109  Hence, there is a side to narratives about disability 
that touches upon how we as human beings create and understand 
meaning, values and make sense of ourselves.  
In contemporary liberal societies people identify themselves with 
culturally given patterns of meaning; they inscribe their lives into these 
patterns and live accordingly.110 As will become apparent in this 
dissertation, I believe that the common assumptions about disability 
are largely a result of the cultural meanings that have been ascribed to 
disability. More precisely: In line with many disability scholars I view 
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disability as part of a historically constructed discourse and ideology of 
thinking about the body. Disability is a social process that involves 
everyone who has a body, which then implies every human being. 
Hence, the concept of disability regulates not only the lives of people 
with disabled bodies, but also the lives of those who perceive 
themselves as normal.111 Disability scholar Lennard J. Davis writes:  
 
[T]he very concept of normalcy by which most people (by definition) 
shape their existence is in fact tied inexorably to the concept of 
disability, or rather, the concept of disability is a function of a 
concept of normalcy. Normalcy and disability are part of the same 
system.112  
 
The connection between the concept of disability and the concept of 
normalcy is in relation to liberal values a theme that pervades all four 
articles in this dissertation, and this is frequently referred to as the 
normalcy narrative. As I will argue, the normalcy narrative stands in a 
dominant position in Western societies and culture, especially with 
regards to the body, health and what is perceived as the good life. The 
prevalent assumption about disability as an error follows a persistent 
binary thinking of e.g. able/disabled, healthy/sick, strong/weak, that in 
a wider context is part of an ideology of control and a politics of power 
and fear.113  
As one begins to untangle the threads of the normalcy narrative it 
becomes clear that disability, and by default normalcy, has a place in at 
least three broad historical traditions in Western thought and 
institutional practice: the religious, medical-scientific, and political 
traditions.114 These three historical traditions are to some extent all 
relevant in this research project. Since this thesis is conducted within 
theology, the (mis)representation of disability in the religious 
(Christian) tradition is pressing.  Because the practice of prenatal testing 
is used as a case to actualize some urgent questions about disability, the 
medical-scientific traditions receive much attention as well. Although 
this thesis is not one in political or social theory, prenatal testing has 
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clear political relevance. In addition my view of politics involves not 
only the activities of government or formal-interest groups 
organizations, but all aspects of institutional organization, public 
action, social practices and habits, and cultural meanings insofar as 
they are potentially subject to collective evaluation and decision 
making.0F115 Therefore this dissertation undoubtedly speak into the 
political discourse as well.  
A running thread in this thesis is my critique against a reductionist 
view of human being, which I claim create harmful patterns of 
exclusion of people with disabilities in much of our physical, social and 
cultural spheres. In my research the strong cultural rationale of 
disability occurs in various relevant cultural narratives that largely 
shape our sense of selves, how we perceive others, and what we regard 
as a good life. These are identified as “the normalcy narrative,” “the 
parenthood narrative,” “the dignity narrative,” and “the friendship 
narrative.” In what follows I will discuss these narratives in a broader 
historical, cultural, ethical and theological context on the one hand, and 
as they appear in the articles on the other. Hence, this is where the 
essential discoveries and content of the articles are discussed.  
3.1 The Normalcy Narrative 
Although the contemporary understanding of disability as a concept 
and categorization is fairly new in a historical perspective, and usually 
described from a Western perspective, there are clear traces of people 
with disabilities being oppressed throughout history. Through the 
Middle Ages disabled people were subjects of superstition, persecution 
and rejection. They were associated with evil and witchcraft, and 
common targets of amusement and ridicule. And though one could 
perhaps assume otherwise, in large, the story follows the same patterns 
in the history of Christianity. One explanation for this is found in 
economy; people with disabilities have throughout history depended 
on charity, the help of others and later on government funding. 
Another explanation is that the common understanding of impairment 
and disability are affected by a deeply rooted fear in culture of the 
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unknown, the anomalous, and the abnormal.116 Whether the 
explanation is found in economy or in a cultural fear, one thing is clear: 
something radical happened with the expressions of oppression against 
people with disabilities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This 
means that if we are to understand why people with disabilities are 
denied human dignity, if we are to think differently about disability, one 
of the first steps is to understand the connection between a physical 
impairment and the political, social and multi-dimensional environ-
ment that places that impairment in a specific arena of meanings and 
significations.117 
3.1.1 A world of norms 
We live in a world of norms.118 We consider what the average person 
does, thinks, earns, or consumes. We rank intelligence, cholesterol 
levels, weight, height, sex drive, and bodily dimensions along some 
conceptual line from subnormal to above-average. Children are ranked 
in school and tested to determine where they fit into a normal curve of 
learning and intelligence. There is probably no area of contemporary 
life in which some idea of a norm or average is not calculated, and 
therefore it can be stated that in one sense or another, each of us usually 
strives to be normal. In article 1 I discuss how the body is highly 
idealized and objectified in Western societies, and that there is a strong 
social pressure to shape, regulate, and normalize one’s body in order to 
ﬁt the normative standard. I highlight examples of how we struggle to 
meet the standards of normality in our attempts to control, mould and 
maintain our bodies, and in so doing I point at how the body in various 
ways is an important showground for social control, not least in the 
area of health and appearance. Now, to understand the disabled body, 
I argue one must turn the attention to the concept of the norm and the 
normal body.119  
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Because much writing on disability has focused on the disabled 
person as the object of study, just as the study of race has focused on 
the person of colour, it appears as a legitimate question to ask why the 
focus should be on normalcy instead of disability? The suggestion, and 
at the same time a key argument in this dissertation, is that the 
“problem” is not the person with disabilities, but the way normalcy is 
constructed to create the problem of the disabled person. For instance, 
in article 1 and 2 I discuss how societal constraints with regards to 
womanhood and motherhood have had devastating consequences 
especially for women with disabilities who are commonly devalued as 
both women and mothers – simply because of their unorthodox bodies 
and minds. Hence, not only has the female body been medicalized 
during modernity, but both women and people with disabilities have 
been viewed as medically abnormal, which means that sickness is 
usually gendered feminine. Not only does this affect how other people 
view or value women and people with disabilities, but also how they 
end up devaluing themselves. Furthermore, the fact that people with 
unorthodox bodies are devalued in society is argued to lead to an 
immense fear of not living up to the standards of embodiment.  
Accordingly, the concept of the norm is argued to partly be a social 
category, rather than a “natural one”. In order to understand this 
mechanism better, I suggest one go back in time when disability was 
regarded somewhat differently from today. As already mentioned, a 
radical change was about to happen in Europe when the ideological 
legitimacy for an intensified oppression of people with disabilities and 
the social process of disabling occurred along with the 
industrialization, and practices and discourses that can be linked to late 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century notions of nationality, race, gender, 
criminality, and sexual orientation.120 In this particular time-period a 
few things stand out as the very foundation for the normalcy narrative.  
A first remark concerns terminology and the entrance of the words 
“norm” and “normal” into the European languages, which happened 
as late as in the nineteenth century. The word “normal” and the concept 
of the norm as “the common type of standard, regular, usual” entered 
the English language around 1840, and was most likely preceded by the 
concept of the “ideal”, a word that can be dated back to the seventeenth 
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century. While the word “ideal” initially had nothing to do with 
attainable bodily standards, the emergence of normalcy transformed its 
meaning into the notion of a positive deviation from the norm.121  
To find some explanations for the conceptualization of the norm one 
can then turn to the discipline of statistics, which in the early modern 
period began as a use of data for “promotion of the sound, well-
informed state policy”. Statistics was later applied to the human body 
when Bisset Hawkins defined medical statistics in 1829 as the 
application of numbers to illustrate the natural history of health and 
disease. Despite its initial purpose, in France, statistics were mainly 
used in the area of public health in the early nineteenth century.122  
3.1.2 The effects of industrialisation 
A second aspect is the changing nature of work during 
industrialization, which I discuss particularly in article 2 in relation to 
the growing medical profession in the Nordic welfare state context. 
High speed factory work was not well suited for “slow” people, and as 
the professional power of health professionals increased the negative 
effects of the industrialization became evident. Policies of segregating 
people with disabilities into various institutional settings, and the 
exclusion of people with disabilities from social and economic life were 
increasingly justified throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Another connection between the emerging notions of the 
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normal body and the industry can further be shown in the fact that the 
leading members of the first British statistical societies were 
industrialists or had close ties to industry. The normal as an imperative 
then became a generalized notion in the mid 1800’s when the way 
astronomers averaged errors in space was applied to human features, 
and the concept of the average man (l’homme moyen) was formulated by 
the French statistician Adolphe Quetelet. His central idea was that this 
figurative human was the average of human attributes in a given 
country, both with regards to a physical average and a moral average 
construct.123  
It is crucial to highlight the social implications of this idea, because 
in formulating the average of man a justification of moderation and 
middle-class ideology could emerge. Now, Quetelet developed an 
analogy between the notion of the average man and the term “juste 
milieu.” Davis suggests that Quetelet’s thinking and usage of this term 
was connected to ideology of Louis Philippe’s July monarchy, and 
influenced by the philosopher Victor Cousin who yielded a concept 
that combined bourgeois hegemony with the constitutional monarchy 
and who celebrated moderation and middleness. Over time the average 
man became the model for the middle way of life, and along the way 
the average became a kind of ideal. Again, it is important to note that 
this is not just a mere fact or a neutral development, but highly 
problematic since the average man applied to both moral qualities and 
to the body.124 This can, for instance, be connected to the fact that 
women with disabilities who wanted to reproduce were viewed as a 
biological, social and moral danger to society. This view was upheld by 
the women’s movement during the twentieth century as well, which I 
problematize in article 2, and which I argue is a prevalent view still 
today.  
Hence, in contrast to the concept of the ideal, the concept of the norm 
inflicts the majority of the population with the demand to be part of the 
norm. When this line of thinking became rooted, the symbol of the 
norm was figuratively imagined as a bell-shaped curve. This curve, the 
graph of an exponential function, was known as the astronomer’s 
“error-law”, “normal distribution”, or simply as “the bell curve”. The 
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majority of the population was thus to fall under the arch of the bell 
curve. As a consequence of this view of the norm, the concept of devia-
tions or extremes emerged. Hence, in a society where the concept of the 
norm is effective, people with disabilities will naturally be thought of 
deviants.125  
3.1.3 The emergence of the eugenic logic 
The use of statistics began an important movement, and an interesting 
fact about the early statisticians is that many of them were eugenicists. 
Hence, there is an actual connection between the statistical measure of 
human beings and aiming at improving humans toward the positive 
extreme. The concrete result of the idea if the norm, then, is that the 
population is divided into standard and nonstandard subpopulations. 
And even though the initial aim of statistics was not to create a norm 
for human beings, both statistics and eugenics bring the concept of the 
norm into society. By constructing the normal body, the disabled body 
is by effect created (article 1).126 
What the eugenic logic did to the bell curve is that it changed form 
and went from idealizing the middle, to a ranking system that put the 
“positive” extreme on top. Francis Galton, the most known pioneering 
eugenicist, who was also the cousin of Charles Darwin, sought to 
redefine the concept of the “ideal” in relation to the general population 
through natural selection. He pursued this firstly through creating the 
idea of a deviant body by applying the idea of norm to the human body 
itself. Secondly, the normal variation of the body was measured against 
a stricter template in order to guide what a normal body should be. 
Thirdly, the revision of the “normal curve of distribution” was changed 
into a ranked order, and all of these formed a new ideal for human 
being. In contrast to the classical ideal, 127 which implied no imperative 
of actually being an ideal human, the statistical ideal strictly imposed 
what people should be like. Hence, the model of the ranked order was 
pushed by the imperative of the norm, and supplemented by notions 
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of progress, human perfectibility, and the elimination of deviance, and 
the cultural vision of what the human body should be was created.128    
An important aspect of this development is that the eugenic logic 
was commonly seen as the ultimate hope for social improvement. Once 
people began to embrace the idea that there are norms and ranks in 
human physiology, the idea that we could increase the intelligence of 
human beings, or decrease birth defects, no longer appeared 
unrealistic. Ideas of this sort were widely influential, and the huge 
impact of eugenic thinking continued well into the twentieth century 
in Europe129 as well as in North-America, to such extent that politically 
and academically influential people could openly suggest that unless 
birth control was encouraged, it would be the same as to say that the 
increase of cripples was encouraged by the state.130 As I demonstrate in 
article 2, this kind of rhetoric was common among early twentieth 
century feminists as well.  
One serious consequence of the will to optimize the population was 
that the eugenicists tended to group together all allegedly 
“undesirable” traits. It was not only people with disabilities that were 
viewed as outcasts, but they were grouped together with criminals, the 
poor, and people with mental illnesses, and all these traits were viewed 
as genetic hereditary flaws. In this way “national fitness” played well 
into the metaphor of the body. However strange this might sound, the 
eugenic notion that individual variations would lead to a broken nation 
was indeed a powerful one. Together with the industrial mentality that 
aimed at creating “universal workers” with uniform characteristics, the 
parallel between the uniform worker and a uniform labour product was 
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drawn.131 A similar conclusion was drawn too with regards to how 
mothers were seen as responsible for the “quality” of their offspring.  
The traces of the normalcy-narrative can be seen in a wide range of 
practices in history. In America they had contests of fitter families based 
on their eugenic family histories, in various places in the world (not 
least in the Nordic countries) the eugenic sterilization practices are well 
documented, the very foundation of the Nazi ideology is built upon the 
eugenic logic, Freud’s widespread theories on normal sexuality and 
sexual development was made possible by the idea of the normal, and 
today we see its relevance still in the practice of corrective surgeries or 
biomedical technologies. The normalcy narrative shows up again and 
again. For this reason a disability consciousness – a disability 
perspective – can alter the way we see not just people with disabilities, 
but all people.132  Lennard states:  
 
[T]he very term that permeates our contemporary life – the normal – 
is a configuration that arose in a particular historical moment. It is 
part of a notion of progress, of industrialization, and of ideological 
consolidation of the power of the bourgeoisie. The implications of 
the hegemony of normalcy are profound and extend into the very 
heart of cultural production.133  
 
As I have shown, the concept of normalcy does not only touch upon 
the will to control one’s own body, but very much upon the 
reproduction of new bodies as well.  
3.1.4 Discussion  
The aim of discussing the normalcy narrative as the dominant cultural 
narrative of embodiment in this thesis is to show that disability and the 
disabled body are part of a greater historically constructed discourse 
and ideology of the body, and that a critical discussion and a 
reimagination of such narratives is necessary. In article 1 the theoretical 
basis for the critical discussion and analysis is found primarily among 
feminist disability scholars who on the one hand address a wide range 
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of feminist issues, and on the other hand make the body, bodily variety, 
and normalization central to analyses of all forms of oppression.  
However, in article 2 I demonstrate that Western feminism has a 
clear connection to the eugenic ideology in the twentieth century, and 
that the strong emphasis in contemporary feminism on rights, 
individual freedom and autonomy, as well as the fear of traditional 
female roles, weakness, and dependency prove to be highly exclusive 
of particularly women with disabilities. I argue that feminism in the 
struggles for women’s rights have focused too much on challenging 
gendered hierarchies and thereby failed to challenge the very structure 
of oppression, especially with regard to reproductive health issues. In 
the attempt to challenge contemporary notions of (reproductive) 
health, normality, womanhood and motherhood I incorporate 
experiences of disabled mothers in the analysis. I argue that in the 
context of the reproductive health discourse, the stories of women with 
disabilities can serve to challenge both feminisms relationship to 
power, and exemplify in what ways feminism has failed to include all 
women in theory. This perspective challenges the troping of disability 
in able-bodied culture as deviance, helplessness, and speaks openly 
about a form of embodiment often excluded from the conversation in 
both disability and feminist discourse. 
In order to challenge the normative standards of embodiment I 
highlight three main aspects of embodiment in article 1: body standards, 
corporeal difference, and vulnerable subjects, all in light of the concept of 
disability. I argue that the normalcy narrative is governed by a 
normalcy structure in society and culture, and that the normalcy 
narrative not only shapes the sense of who we are, but restricts the life 
of people with deviating bodies and limits the imaginations of those 
who think of themselves as normal. Prenatal testing and selective 
abortion is used as an example of the normalcy narrative at play as it is 
argued to be an important source of expressed notions about what it 
means to be human and to have a human body. As I have touched upon 
in this chapter, one problematic issue with normative standards of 
embodiment is the connection between bodies and people: not only are 
deviating bodies devalued, but the very people in those bodies. Because 
current perceptions of embodiment devalue some people, this makes 
having a disability a clear disadvantage in society, which in turn leads 
to an immense fear of not living up to the standards.  
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In the counter-narrative about embodiment that I propose in this 
thesis I integrate a feminist perspective and life-stories about people 
with disabilities on the one hand, and a theological account of health 
on the other. I argue that narratives of corporeal difference serve the 
purpose of challenging the political agenda of feminism that claims 
women to be strong, independent, and controlled, and I maintain that 
these narratives are crucial in the project of rethinking relations 
between bodies and selves, subjects and societies. The feminist notion 
of otherness is discussed since many feminist thinkers maintain that 
otherness is limited by culture but also that it can be said to limit the 
culture, and I argue that dominant narratives of otherness hinders 
counter-narratives to be equally important.  
As for the life-stories I also underline that it is of importance how 
they are told. Embodiment does in general have multiple cultural 
meanings, and especially people with disabilities are simultaneously 
viewed as invisible and hyper-visible. Therefore, it is argued that we 
need to avoid telling stories that send a message that serves to 
legitimize objectification, humiliation and disrespect. Feminist 
disability theory presses us to ask what kind of knowledge is produced 
though bodies radically different from the standard. Acknowledging 
stories about lived, experienced, different embodiments is a first step 
away from the notion of one standard body and towards an 
understanding of the link between difference and sameness.  
The concept of vulnerability has in recent years been increasingly 
included in political, philosophical, theological, and critical theories of 
human being and human embodiment. However, in the normalcy 
narrative vulnerability and dependency are aspects of human 
embodiment that we are still taught to ignore. These are symbols of a 
life not worth living, and therefore people with disabilities who expose 
vulnerability in society cause great anxiety. On the other hand, 
disability can also point at the fact that life can be lived with pain. I 
claim that disability narratives can teach consciousness a certain kind 
of freedom from the sufferings and limitations of the body, and one 
step towards accepting pain as a natural part of life is argued to be to 
deprive it of meaning. Furthermore, I argue that the body is not only 
vulnerable to life itself, but that it is excessive to its own boundaries in 
what I call “intercorporeal vulnerability”. Based on the thoughts of 
Margrit Shildrick I explain this intercorporeal vulnerability as to 
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compromise on one’s own control by touching another person, a touch 
that affects both parties. The touch that I intend transcends both the 
material and the mental as it can involve physical contact as well as 
simply “being in touch”. In this way our being in the world is 
understood as becoming. The body is changing through every touch. 
To exemplify what this means I draw on life-stories about people with 
disabilities who describe their bodily experiences through being in 
touch with other bodies. 
In this thesis I maintain that a theological account of human being 
and health can bring another depth to the counter-narrative I am 
proposing. Not only do I argue to include people with disabilities on a 
conceptual level, but that it is sufficient in changing social practices as 
well. Aware of the fact that religious values connected to sexuality and 
reproduction have controlled women’s sexuality and made 
motherhood a “compulsory trap”, I point out that a reason for this 
might be due to the fact that a lot of research and teaching on religion 
and sex has been constructed from an exclusively male perspective. For 
this reason, I do find it important to involve a feminist approach in the 
theological reflection. In articulating a conception of human (well-) 
being that claims inter-personal relations as both determinant and 
necessary the arguments are inspired by the Barthian tradition of 
relational human being, as well as a disability hermeneutics. I argue 
that when personhood itself is defined in terms of relationality, the 
health of an individual will always be dependent on the inter-
connectedness with other human beings, which is a huge leap away 
from a self-centred and individualistic understanding of well-being. 
Just as I in article 1 argue that pain is never the whole of human 
experience, so do I in article 2 argue that bodily health is not to be 
equated with the whole of human well-being. Therefore any theological 
talk of “wholeness” should be treated with caution, since the 
dichotomy between wholeness and brokenness too often has worked 
to stigmatize people with broken bodies and minds. I argue that the 
concept of relationality offers theology a way to re-imagine disability, 
healing and liberation for people with disabilities in a very concrete 
way, and that liberation has little to do with a body refashioned and 
remade. 
To be a body is to be unstable. To be a body is to be in constant 
change. To change is to become. In order to start the journey of 
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becoming, one has to invite vulnerability along. One way of inviting 
vulnerability along is to get in touch, physically or mentally, with 
bodies in distress; bodies that seemingly are more vulnerable to life; 
bodies that have been forced to accept painful sensations; bodies that 
the normalcy narrative has taught us to ignore. Experience-based 
narratives of embodiment expand our comforting truths and reveal 
that there are no given certainties. I believe that re-conceptualizing the 
meanings of embodiment ultimately is what can lead us to reimagining 
our comforting narratives of embodiment and hence create a more 
compassionate and just society. 
As mentioned, one example of the possible consequences of the 
normalcy narrative that I emphasize in this thesis is prenatal diagnosis 
and selective abortion. Being part of routine maternity care in the 
Nordic countries, prenatal diagnosis is a major source of expressed 
notions about what it means to be human and to have a human body. 
These notions affect most pregnant women (and their partners) in 
important decisions regarding reproduction, and due to the strong 
focus on ﬁnding foetuses with genetic and chromosomal deviations, 
people with disabilities are clearly affected by the practice and the 
values expressed – in one way or another. As reproductive technologies 
are often discussed in the light of reproductive autonomy – the right to 
make decisions about one’s reproduction – I believe it is important to 
point out that the will to control our own bodies inevitably will affect 
our moral judgements with regard to prospective children. In what 
follows I will therefore turn to the second cultural narrative I have 
found to create harmful patterns of exclusion of people with 
disabilities, namely the parenthood narrative.  
3.2 The Parenthood Narrative 
In the world of norms, reproduction is a pressing subject. As I will 
argue in this thesis, particularly in articles 2 and 3, having children is a 
vital part of people’s lives in today’s society and for the sense of having 
a flourishing life. Hence, values of parenthood and family life constitute 
desires and commitments for many, and therefore questions 
concerning reproduction do reveal underlying assumptions about 
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normality, sexuality, social relationships, health and embodiment. 
These values are, like many other personal values, strongly connected 
to various institutions in society and to the surrounding culture. Along 
with the industrialization of Europe, the nuclear family became a 
necessary “ideal” form for family life. The emergence of liberal 
ideology with “free choice” at its core has worked to support the 
thought of smaller family units, and despite the vast variety of family 
forms that today exist, the imperative of free choice has in relation to 
family life made the nuclear family the normal family form.134 The right 
to reproductive freedom and autonomy has an important place in 
Western political thought, and is thus embedded in any democratic 
culture. Within this culture the genetic and reproductive technologies 
are understood as a route towards increased choice regarding 
reproduction. Genetic knowledge offers potential parents the choice of 
preventing the conception or birth of affected individuals through 
genetic counselling, prenatal diagnosis, or progressively sophisticated 
methods such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis – all practices that 
are regarded to increase the range of choices, and enhancing 
reproductive freedom.135 
It appears to be a common belief that more choices are equal to more 
freedom. But on the flipside of the “freedom-coin” is the medical, social 
and political government over people’s lives – including their 
                                                     
134 Important to note is however that various family patterns that now are imaginable 
would not have been so only a few generations back. In general people are less likely 
to marry today than they once were, and those who do get married do so at a later stage 
in life. Nevertheless, Anthony Giddens point out that more and more people chose to 
live together and to cohabit. This means that while the institutions of family and 
marriage still exist and are important, their character has radically changed. One 
important change is in the expectations of relationships today. In late modernity 
relationship is something active, and increasingly dependent on collaboration and 
communication. Nevertheless, traditional family patterns are still the norm and 
therefore atypical family forms are met with great resistance. See Giddens 2001, 172-
173, 178.  
135 Westerlund 2009, 42-43; Lindfelt 2009, 68; Scully et al. 2006, 22; See also Beattie 2014. 
In the article “Barn, föräldrablivande och meningsmönster” (“Children, conceiving 
parenthood and patterns of meaning”) Mikael Lindfelt discusses the seemingly narrow 
conditions for what constitutes “the normal family”, and highlights not only that the 
imaginations of the normal family do not entail impairments, but neither does it usually 
encompass adoptive children or foster children, see Lindfelt 2009, 69; Also Westerlund 
2012. 
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reproduction. The welfare system, health care professionals, and 
economic systems, for instance, all regulate and inform people’s choices 
and freedom. This is sometimes referred to as “institutionalized 
individualism” in modern Western societies. At the centre of this idea 
is that people are to take control over their lives, not least in the 
reproductive sphere. Whereas trying to control reproduction has 
indeed been a human activity from far back in history, the conditions 
for family planning have in the liberal society changed immensely with 
the emergence of reproductive technologies, as well as with the 
increased equality between the sexes and the emancipation of people 
with different sexual orientations. Not only can children be aspired to 
fit into the normalcy paradigm through various pedagogical practices 
and therapies, but with reproductive technologies, such as prenatal 
testing, it is possible to control what kind of children that are being born 
in the first place.136  
As I demonstrate in article 3, a consequence of this new technology 
available is that many women experience an immense pressure to 
control their reproduction not only in terms of reproducing at the right 
time in life, but also to have the right kind of child. Before the existence 
of reproductive technologies, the foetus was assumed to be “normal” 
until otherwise was proven. That is, abnormality was not looked for but 
was confirmed usually as late as at the birth. In this sense reproductive 
technologies have contributed to a slight attitudinal turn with regards 
to pregnancy itself as the aim of health professionals today is to find 
out – to control – whether the foetus is “normal” or not. This aim is put 
into effect by the implementation of prenatal tests. Although there is no 
formal demand on participating in the prenatal tests that are offered, it 
is frequently said to be the responsible thing to do both with regards to 
the society and with regards to the life of the prospective parents, since 
it is imagined that a society with as few people with disabilities as 
possible is a sign of advancement and improvement. The pressure to 
live up to the norm and the normal family is conveyed not least through 
the shame of being different.137 
The social pressure to plan and control one’s pregnancy is an 
indication that the normality that surrounds parenthood and 
                                                     
136 Hall 2008, 3-4; Gordon 2007, 357; Westerlund 2009, 44-46, 52. 
137 Westerlund 2009, 52-53; Ginsburg & Rapp 2010, 242, 
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pregnancy is enforced by experts. Despite the growing tendency to be 
sceptical about authoritative knowledge, I argue that we still live in a 
time with great trust to experts in general, and the medicalization of 
pregnancy and parenthood implies that expectations are formed by a 
system of expertise that is based on authoritative knowledge. In the 
articles 2 and 3 I argue that the dominance of health professionals as 
gatekeepers of (reproductive) health, and the system of 
institutionalized individualism result in diffuse and problematic ideas 
of parenthood. Surrounded by experts and technological possibilities, 
prospective parents are overwhelmed with choices and challenges 
already before a child exists.138 It seems as if the very concept of 
parenthood is at stake in this debate. Hence, what is it that constitutes 
parenthood in contemporary liberal Western societies? The possibility 
to control what kind of children we have actualizes the question of 
whether disabled children can/should be part of the family dream. And 
the issue of sharing one’s life with a disabled child is therefore related 
to the broader issue of meaning in contemporary society.139  
Though there are various ways of understanding meaning, or 
meaningfulness, in this thesis I am interested in the question of what 
constitutes life as meaningful. Hence what characterizes a life as 
meaningful, or what is characterized as hindering life from being 
meaningful?140 In life, I suggest, some events bear meaning-making 
potential, and some do not. Parenthood is here taken to bear such 
potential, while in liberal culture having a disabled child appears to 
interrupt the meaning-making potential of parenthood, and by effect 
hinders life from being perceived as meaningful. In order to capture if 
and in what ways patterns of parenthood are oppressive for people 
with disabilities, it is a crucial task to explore how we can understand 
the meaning-making potential of parenthood in a reproductive 
landscape characterized foremost by control, information and the 
normalcy narrative? 
                                                     
138 Westerlund 2009, 53-54.  
139 Reinders 2000.  
140 Cf. Wolf 2016, 256. 
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3.2.1 Meaning-making patterns of parenthood  
The physical event of delivering a child is usually described as an 
existential experience like no other, but it is the becoming of a parent that 
holds a key position in many conceptions of a flourishing life as a 
whole.141 Mikael Lindfelt writes:  
 
To have a child is to be linked to the continuous chain of life, to 
become a part of a social context that in a special way connects 
history with future, and that can be seen as an expression for an 
embodied hope.142  
 
It would be unreasonable to suggest that family planning and repro-
duction is entirely in the hands of experts, because the issue is of course 
much more complex than that. Though it can be debated on why it so, 
which is also a disputed issue in this thesis, it is a fact that the birth of 
a child with an impairment is highly stigmatizing in Western countries. 
As already touched upon in the previous chapter, and as I argue 
throughout this dissertation: to most people, disability and people with 
disabilities are spontaneously disturbing and unsettling, and because 
having a child with an impairment is frequently attributed either to 
inadequate health practices or to the bad genes of the parents, this is no 
incomprehensible fact.143  
In article 3 I discuss the common belief that an impairment of a child 
would place an economic and/or emotional burden on its parents – a 
burden that is not part of the family dream, not part of the choice to 
become a parent. The statistics show that many choose to have an 
abortion in case of foetal abnormality, usually Down syndrome, which 
on the one hand reflects the attitude among prospective parents, and 
the attitude among legislators on the other, as even late-term abortions 
are permitted in most Western countries only in the case of foetal 
abnormality. And even though there are many stories by parents to 
children with disabilities that challenge this belief, it is sometimes true 
that a child with an impairment does cause a lot of hardship on the 
                                                     
141 Lindfelt 2009, 68-70. 
142 Lindfelt 2009, 70. Translation my own. 
143 Vehmas 2002, 93-94. 
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family.144 In a recently published book about families with “special 
children”145 there are several testimonies of what such hardships might 
look like. One mother says:  
 
The list of medications that Leo needed during a day admitted to half 
a page, and some of the medications were to be given four or five 
times a day. Different problems occurred all the time. At some point 
the kidneys stopped working and the epileptic seizures escalated 
over time.146     
 
Another mother describes the difficulty in balancing her own well-
being with that of her disabled son, and with that of the siblings: 
 
I never had any time to myself, and the times I would do something 
I had to make the other siblings take care of Oscar and help out in 
the home. That led to me having a bad conscience, but I had no other 
choice. I was still lucky not to become depressed as I got help in 
time.147 
 
In this thesis such testimonies reveal the hardships of everyday life 
with a disabled family member. But equally important, I suggest, are 
the stories of parents to disabled children that reveal the hardships of 
not fitting into a normal meaning-making family pattern,148 because 
many of them entail the claim that the biggest difficulty is trying to 
explain what their life is like and fit into the surrounding community 
with “normal” families. Hence, the normative context for family life is 
informed by experiences based on normal family patterns, which 
makes atypical family forms appear problematic. The risk is, then, that 
the atypical families are discriminated against, which in turn will lead 
to an immense pressure to live up to the ideal.149 
                                                     
144 Vehmas 2002, 94, 100; Solberg 2009, 193. 
145 “Special children” is an expression that I generally find problematic, but I chose to 
use here because that is how the parents in the book refer to their children.  
146 Henriksdotter 2016, 56. Translation my own.  
147 Henriksdotter 2016, 47. Translation my own. 
148 See articles 2 and 3; Katarina Westerlund discusses the normal meaning-making 
family patterns more extensively in Westerlund 2012; 2002, 138-145. 
149 Lindfelt 2009, 73; Solberg 2009, 187-189. This is also true with regards to gay and 
lesbian family forms, although such partnerships usually witness a greater equality and 
commitment than many hetero-sexual relationships. See Giddens 2001, 192-193. 
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In contemporary Western societies it is commonly believed that 
meaning is in our own making, that meaning is to be produced by our 
own deliberate activity. Hans S. Reinders describes this modern view 
of the quest for meaning as characterized by activist notions of 
“giving”, “constructing”, “inventing”, which indicate their 
displacement in previous notions such as “receiving”, “finding”, and 
“discovering”. Because people with disabilities, especially intellectual 
disabilities, are not regarded to be able to act in a meaningful way – i.e. 
their life has no meaning – it is difficult to comprehend how sharing 
one’s life with them would bear any meaning-making potential.150  
However, how can people have any idea of what it means to share 
one’s life with a person with disability and care for them, unless one is 
actually engaged in doing so?151 As one of the tasks in this thesis is to 
make visible different narratives and atypical experiences, also referred 
to as counter-narratives,152 I will in what follows briefly reflect upon 
some characteristics of “atypical meaning-making family patterns” to 
map out a context in which the narratives of families with disabled 
family members can be perceived as meaningful. 
3.2.2 Foundations for atypical meaning-making family 
patterns 
The way we narrate our experiences will define the meaning we ascribe 
to certain events, such as becoming parents. The problematic issue 
regarding atypical families is that narratives about parenthood that fit 
into the normalcy-narrative are the ones receiving most attention in the 
public sphere, and thereby atypical narratives are privatized and 
placed outside the meaning-making potential of parenthood.153 
However, not all people find meaning in the exact same way, because 
there are various culturally given patterns of meanings, and therefore 
the perspective of the meaning-making of otherness has to be 
                                                     
150 Reinders 2000, 193-194. 
151 Reinders 2000, 194. 
152 See Methodological considerations.  
153 Note that this is also true in the philosophical debate. E.g. Peter Singer discards 
experience-based narratives of family life in the discourse about the moral significance 
of personhood with the argument that they would not resolve the ethical question 
anyways. Singer 2010, 341. 
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recognized in the task of de-stabilizing normative conceptions of 
parenthood.154   
There are indeed various existential meanings that can be found in 
the different patterns of parenthood,155 and the one most relevant for 
understanding the mechanisms of the meaning-making potential of 
atypical parenthood is that about community and belonging, which 
implies that the sense of meaning springs from inter-personal 
relationships. This can be understood in either a historical sense; for 
example that human beings stand in relationship to earlier 
communities and/or extended family; or in the sense that the primary 
meaning-making potential lies in present inter-personal 
relationships.156 In this view the need to give and receive care and love 
are the point of destination for the meaning-making of parenthood.157 
Placing the very destination for meaning-making in community and 
belonging is naturally a stark contrast to the liberal values of 
autonomous choice and freedom, and in the ethical debate about 
reproductive issues this has been argued to be problematic.158 If 
meaning springs from belonging, then individual freedom is at risk 
naturally, since belonging as a concept presupposes that one in one way 
or another surrenders to the greater whole. But belonging as the 
primary meaning-making aspect implies that various communities, 
fellowships or kinships are expressed in a positive heteronomy in which 
it is possible to live in an intimate relationship with another human 
being without losing oneself. Within feminist bioethics an alternative 
understanding of autonomy has been developed that is in line with the 
concept of belonging namely the concept of autokoenony,159 which 
implies that individuals are subjects who are closely connected with 
other subjects and therefore in need of them, but nevertheless not 
                                                     
154 Reinders 2000, 197; Lindfelt 2009, 74-75, 82-83. 
155 For a more extensive account of these, see Lindfelt 2009, 88-109. 
156 In article 2 I discuss further the concepts of inter-corporeal vulnerability as a 
fundamental essence of human being and what it means to be an embodied being.   
157 Lindfelt 2009, 93; See also “Meaningfulness: A Third Dimension of the Good Life” 
(2016) by Susan Wolf for an account of meaningfulness as involving both a subjective 
and an objective condition linked together in proper ways.  
158 Singer 2010, 341. 
159 First proposed by Sarah Lucia Hoagland (1988), and further interpreted and 
developed into bioethics by Susan Sherwin and Rosemarie Tong.  
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entirely dependent on them.160 Belonging can be found either in the 
two-ness of a couple, or in the greater community of friends, families, 
or other kinds of smaller communities, and thus constitute “a family of 
choice”, which is a term sometimes applied to gay communities as 
well.161 Since families with a disabled child, out of both necessity and 
choice, have a big family of choice with e.g. assistants, care takers, and 
therapists, it is clear that the sense of meaning evolves in the wider 
network of people – the chosen family.162 
A disabled child does not only represent a disease, but a radical 
difference, and therefore difference or otherness challenges one of the 
key purposes of reproduction: the meaning-making potential of 
parenthood and family life. But the birth of child with an impairment 
can from the perspective of belonging be viewed as an occasion for 
meaning-making, precisely because the caretaking of a disabled child 
demands different and expanded resources than what can be provided 
by most parents without additional support. The stories of “an 
unexpected journey to an unknown world” offer a hope in the face of 
crisis when a disabled child is born, or when an anomalous foetus is 
discovered through prenatal testing. Studies have shown that there is a 
direct relationship between the initial efforts of families to reimagine 
their narratives and the more public actions they undertake to help 
rescript narratives of inclusion at a broader cultural level. This, 
however, means that the possibility for imagining a different and 
perhaps unanticipated social landscape in the sphere of parenthood 
requires that the stories of atypical parenthood are actually heard. The 
revelations of the limits of kinship-based caretaking and the need for 
broader social recognition and resources for people with disabilities 
offer a foundation for the meaning-making of atypical parenthood, a 
model for familial inclusion and for social inclusion as well. 163 
From this perspective, then, the link between autonomous choice 
and freedom is indeed questionable. As has been argued by some, 
parenthood is essentially unconditional. Berge Solberg states: “You do 
not become a more autonomous or freer parent by being given the 
                                                     
160 Nyrövaara 2011, 94-95; Tong 1999, 41.  
161 Lindfelt 2009, 96-97; Vanier 1998, 39-47, 52; Giddens 2001, 192.  
162 Henriksdotter 2016. 
163 Solberg 2009, 193-194; Ginsburg &  Rapp 2010, 239-246; Reinders 2000, 17-18. 
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choice of throwing away your children when you become tired of them. 
Again, it is the opposite: good parenthood is good precisely because it 
is unconditional.”164 What is at stake with regards to parenthood in 
Western liberal societies is ultimately a question of culture, and as I will 
argue in this thesis, the benefits of giving and receiving love and care 
are primarily consequential as opposed to conditional.165  
3.2.3 God as the source of meaning 
In this theological thesis the talk of God naturally occurs, and the 
Christian narrative is implemented in the analyses since I strongly 
believe that a theological perspective can bring another depth to the 
ethical, political and cultural discourse about disability and dignity. 
The arguments put forward in the articles (especially article 2 and 4) 
are in large based on the concept of relationality, or otherwise 
expressed inter-personal relationships, and therefore I would like to 
note here that in this particular context the meaning-making potential 
is, or at least can be, strongly anchored in God.  
God can be viewed as a separate category outside the community, 
but also as an aspect embedded in the inter-personal relationships, as 
part of the concept of relationality itself. If God is viewed separately 
from the concept of relationality, it means that God has a prioritized 
position in relation to other relationships. This means that the meaning-
making potential relies upon the relationship to the divine. From 
another perspective God can be viewed as an essential dimension of the 
interpersonal relationships, and the reactive presence of God is thus 
visible in the continuous act of creation.166 This means that the divinely 
rooted meaning found in interpersonal relationships is dependent on 
various understandings and descriptions of who God is. One central 
aspect of the being of God, I propose, is that human beings cannot nego-
tiate the conditions of their existence. It means that God’s presence is in 
everyday life, in the needs, desires and the commitments of people. 
Lindfelt asserts: “The one who recognizes life as the life of God, reacts 
in a different way than one who, for example, merely sees the 
                                                     
164 Solberg 2009, 197: This argument is further developed in article 2 and 3.  
165 Cf. Reinders 2000.  
166 Lindfelt 2009, 102-103.  
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symmetrical, mutual love as any other human relationship as a mutual 
contract of utility.”167  
3.2.4 Discussion 
There are many aspects of the normalcy-narrative that can be problem-
atized, and I have here tried to point at a few aspects with regard to 
parenthood that are an important basis for the arguments that I pose in 
this thesis. I believe it is important to lay out that the question of when, 
why and how reproductive technologies, such as prenatal testing, are 
implemented in health care is not merely a question of ethics, but very 
much about people’s lives and what makes people’s lives meaningful. 
The conception of meaning as a matter of choice and decision has 
implications for how people think about the meaning of having 
children. If we regard children as a means to our own fulfillment, the 
presence of a disabled child is going to cause a great deal of stress and 
frustration, not only because the presence of such a child reduces our 
capacity to control our lives but also because we are committed to a 
conception of a meaningful life that is inevitably going to make our 
disabled child look like a failure. One of things that atypical parenthood 
reveal is that meaning can be defined in terms different from those in 
liberal culture.168 The narrative of parenthood is not just about what 
choices are right or wrong, but about understanding the complexity of 
the various narratives that shape and inform our lives. 
In this thesis parenthood is discussed in relation to disability from 
two viewpoints: firstly from the perspective of who can reproduce and 
become a parent, and secondly from the perspective of what kind of 
children fit into meaning-making patterns of parenthood. In the articles 
I show that both of these perspectives reveal harmful patterns of 
exclusion of people with disabilities, since neither disabled children nor 
disabled mothers are viewed as desirable in normal family patterns.    
In article 2 I incorporate narratives of women with disabilities and 
their experiences of womanhood, sexuality, reproduction, and 
oppression, and I argue that through their stories a wider conception of 
what it means to be a woman and mother, what it means to be human 
                                                     
167 Lindfelt 2009, 104. Translation my own. 
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emerges. I argue that these stories, having received little attention in 
the discourse about reproduction, expose how many women with 
disabilities long for motherhood, but are perceived to lack the skill and 
maturity to pursue it. An important aspect of these stories is that these 
women are excluded from normative conceptions of both womanhood 
and motherhood, and since being married and having children have 
long constituted “normal womanhood,” these roles are frequently 
presumed tickets to “normalcy.” Hence, the normalcy structure is here 
too proven to be highly influential for both gender roles and on the 
meaning-making potential of parenthood. The stories of women with 
disabilities make it clear that the traditional female roles, that are 
strongly rejected by particular versions of liberal feminism, are 
desirable to many women with disabilities, and I find it pressing to note 
that there is a huge difference between being discouraged from having 
children because of a feminist commitment to abortion rights, and 
because of an ableist discrimination against disabled persons in 
general.  
In order to challenge the normative ableist conception of parenthood 
I strongly argue that the stories of atypical parenthood need to be 
recognized in reproductive ethics, but in the wider culture as well. In 
article 2 I argue that while such experiences can be said to previously 
have been quantitatively marginal, the prolonged life span of people 
with disabilities and the increased number of people with disabilities 
marrying and having children has grown significantly, and thus made 
relevant their experiences of sexuality and reproduction. It needs to be 
recognized that motherhood is an actual reality in the lives of disabled 
women’s (people’s) lives, and that it is an important occasion for 
meaning-making in their lives. Their presumed lack in ability to pursue 
parenthood needs further to be problematized, because while it is true 
that the sense of guilt is oftentimes intensified for mothers with 
disabilities, due to the disability making a lot of things difficult to 
undertake, it is however important to raise the question of what the 
most important part of being a mother actually is? Is it for instance 
playing around with your child, completing tasks fast, or is it emotional 
caring, commitment and closeness? Belonging as the primary source for 
meaning-making points at the relevance of the latter since others can in 
fact help out with activities, and the home can be built to make 
everyday life easier. Many of the accounts of mothers with disabilities 
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bear witness of how difficulties can turn into an asset in life. In this 
sense atypical family forms image a beautiful account of parenthood 
that can liberate “normal” parents from the increased critical gaze by 
health professionals who are eager to give medical advice and guidance 
on reproduction and parenting.  
In this dissertation I want to challenge the underlying ableist 
ideology in normative parenthood narratives by suggesting that the 
experience of disability makes visible that all mothering is shared and 
relational. Particularly in the context of the health discourse, the stories 
of women with disabilities can serve to challenge both feminisms 
relationship to power, and exemplify in what ways feminism has failed 
to include all women in theory. I argue that the disability perspective 
on womanhood and motherhood can challenge the troping of disability 
in able-bodied culture as deviance, helplessness, and speaks openly 
about a form of embodiment often excluded from the conversation in 
both disability and feminist discourse. The other valuable purpose for 
including these stories is as a starting point for the theological 
reflection. Besides the significance of inviting the voices of 
marginalized people, narrative studies with mothers with disabilities 
can offer valuable insights into the embodied, interactional aspects of 
health and disability. 
Hence, the first perspective on parenthood narratives has to do with 
the parenting role and the question of who is to reproduce. The second 
perspective on parenthood is discussed in relation to question of what 
kind of children fit into meaning-making patterns of parenthood. The 
practice of prenatal testing is discussed most explicitly in article 3, and 
in the first part of the article I show that the practice is informed by 
narrow conceptions of what it means to be human. Perspectives are 
brought to light that have been made invisible in the introduction and 
implementation of prenatal diagnosis in the Nordic countries as well as 
in the ethical debate. For instance, the one value that can be pointed out 
as the superior ethical principle in favour of implementing prenatal 
testing is autonomous choice in relation to utility and prevention of 
harm. The question is then what autonomy actually means when the 
majority of pregnant women feel pressured to participate in the tests? 
And what does autonomy mean when the genetic counselling 
concerning prenatal diagnosis often is concentrated on mere medical 
facts? I suggest that the principle of autonomy is an expression of a 
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narrow conception of life (with limited capabilities), and a narrow 
conception of morality as well.  
As I have pointed out already in this chapter, and as I argue in the 
article, many parents with disabled children tell stories about quite 
happy children and quite happy lives, and therefore I propose that the 
discussion about prenatal diagnosis should be widened from ideas of 
normality to incorporate happiness, love, friendship and relationship 
as important aspects of parenthood, and human life in general. I do 
believe there are valid arguments for and against implementing 
prenatal screening in maternity care, but I claim there is a moral cost 
involved as abortion is the main “treatment” available for eliminating 
disability. I suggest that parenthood ought to be about making possible 
happy lives for our children, as opposed to merely making possible 
having medically “normal” children. I problematize whether 
autonomy, utility, prevention and rights are the best guiding tools for 
prospective parents and pregnant women to make good decisions 
regarding their pregnancy and future children? I strongly dispute 
whether autonomy as a superior value will bring people to a qualitative 
life, and whether the pursuit to be medically normal leads to 
happiness? 
3.3 The Dignity Narrative 
Thus far I have outlined some key features of the cultural narratives of 
normalcy and parenthood, and I have pointed at some of the challenges 
that disability poses to understandings of human being and 
parenthood. One of the biggest challenges that disability presents us 
with appears to be the question of the quality of life. In a society 
characterized by a eugenic logic conceptions of quality of life do not 
encompass deviance and weakness. Therefore, disability occurs as a 
threat to individual autonomy, freedom and the right to live our lives 
as we please – aspects of what is frequently taken to be criteria for good 
quality of life. Disability threatens many of those aspects we value 
about our lives, things that make our lives worth living, things that we 
believe to bring meaning to our lives. But the disability concept calls 
into question yet another threat, which is about the very basis for 
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common notions about the quality of life, namely the value of human 
dignity and the worth of human beings. In a world of norms, the human 
dignity of people with deviant bodies and minds is threatened, because 
the dominant cultural narrative of human dignity is based on notions 
of humanity that clearly does not include people with disabilities, 
especially people with intellectual disabilities.  
The traces of the normalcy narrative and the eugenic logic are thus 
at the very core of the human dignity discourse. In articles 3 and 4 I 
discuss the concept of human dignity in a more constructive manner, 
and I defend on the one hand the moral significance of people with 
disabilities, and an inclusive concept of human dignity on the other 
hand. In what follows I will outline some of the main aspects that I take 
to be part of what I call the dignity narrative – the assumed notion that 
all human beings are of equal worth and therefore deserve equal 
respect – and I will highlight the problematic features with regard to 
people with disabilities and common social responses to them, in 
particular in the biomedical context.  
3.3.1 A historical concept of human dignity 
Contemporary understandings of dignity differ largely from historical 
notions of the concept, and since the historical development of dignity 
is highly ambiguous depending on the context it is challenging to 
outline a straightforward background to the dignity narrative. 
Nevertheless, I will outline some of the key elements in its 
development. The concept of human dignity has a long history tracing 
back to the antiquity, the Greek and Roman stoics, the Aristotelian 
tradition, a number of ancient literary works, and in various religions 
and cultures. Historically human dignity has served to answer the 
theoretical question of the place of human beings in the world, and it 
has implied that human beings are distinguished from the rest of the 
nature. The term dignity was initially used to express the special 
position of human beings, while the moral relevance of human dignity 
– as we tend to think of morality today – occurred later. One could 
describe this twofold conception as “initial dignity” and “realized 
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dignity”.169 The actual word dignity comes from the Latin words 
dignitas (worth) and dignus (worthy). In ancient Greece and Rome 
dignity was frequently attached to traits such as physical skills and 
intellectual wisdom, but more importantly so, dignity referred to the 
elevated position of the ruling aristocratic class in society. People could 
thus differ in dignity, depending on the degree they were able to 
manifest these traits, and in this sense dignity could increase or 
decrease. In practice, human dignity was only applied to very few 
people, and was therefore not a universal concept at all. In fact, the 
Roman dignitas is a complex notion that goes beyond worthiness. One 
could be of high rank in society without being regarded as worthy. The 
essential aspect was that dignity expressed a relation, a position of 
being over someone else.170 
The Stoics, Pico della Mirandola and Immanuel Kant are examples 
of influential theorists of the historical concept of human dignity, that 
are still of relevance in the current debate. The stoic philosopher Cicero 
makes a sharp distinction between animals and humans, and it is 
precisely the rational nature of human being that bestows her with 
dignity. In the stoic tradition dignity is further connected to a moral 
virtue: one should live one’s life worthy of dignity. The Renaissance 
philosopher Pico della Mirandola claimed that human beings were 
created by God to be free to form their own nature, and this is, 
according to him, the very basis for her dignity.171  
Without discarding the importance of these earlier philosophies on 
dignity, the first major theorist of dignity in the Western tradition is 
generally regarded to be Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). While he is a 
famous historical thinker, he is considered part of the contemporary 
thinking about human dignity as well. Influenced by the stoics’ idea of 
the dignity of persons as based on humanity’s rational perspective, 
Kant viewed dignity as an ethical principle inferring that human beings 
should not solely be treated as mere means, but as ends in 
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themselves.172 The Kantian concept of dignity was closely connected 
with the human capacity to act morally, which is tied to the faculties of 
reason and freedom. The Categorical Imperative implied that one has 
a duty towards oneself not to violate the privilege one has over other 
creatures. Hence, the principle of human dignity was considered to be 
a moral principle intended to guide people in their deliberation on 
moral problems. Yet in a Kantian perspective, dignity is an absolute 
inner value all human beings possess precisely in their inherent 
capacity to think and act rationally. While the Kantian view is generally 
perceived as the secular foundation of human dignity, the capacity to 
reason has within the Christian tradition also been strongly identified 
with being in God’s image, Imago Dei, especially in the early formative 
centuries of the Christian church.173  
Thomas Aquinas is one of the most influential theological thinkers 
regarding dignity. In Aquinas view of man, he points at a hierarchy of 
the powers of the soul. The highest level of the soul is for him the 
intellective soul, and this is what ultimately defines human nature and 
personhood. Although never discussing the concept of dignity 
explicitly, Aquinas appears to justify human dignity as relying upon 
personhood. He also relates the idea of Imago Dei to the intellectual 
nature of man. Some theologians have pointed out that Aquinas view 
on the intellect is that reason is the ultimate good and true, which is 
God, and hence nothing that can be elevated.174    
Though the capacity to reason has indeed been defined in various 
ways from “knowledge” to “self-consciousness” to “self-
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transcendence” to “free will” and “choice,” reason has nevertheless 
been viewed as the primary criteria of being in God’s image, or, in other 
words, as a criterion for human dignity. And considering people who 
have been perceived as human beings with “little reason” – e.g. young 
children, women, elderly people, or people with intellectual disabilities 
– the connection between human dignity and reason can be shown to 
have been very harmful.175 Considering the devastating consequences 
such a view has had particularly on people with intellectual disabilities, 
an important task in article 4 is to challenge this view from the 
perspective of profound intellectual disability and show that dignity is 
instead dependent on other variables in life, such as relationship and 
the goodness in being God’s creature.    
3.3.2 A contemporary concept of human dignity 
As has been suggested above, contemporary concepts of dignity differ 
largely from the historical notions, not least in the present emphasis on 
rights. Up until World War II human dignity was unknown in national 
law texts, but the violation of the dignity of groups of individuals in the 
Nazi regime, Hiroshima, Rwanda and other atrocities have called for a 
new respect for the dignity of vulnerable subjects and a new way of 
thinking ethics. The contemporary notion has therefore come to refer to 
an inherent value of human beings, and it has strong moral implica-
tions.176 The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
says that: “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation 
of freedom, justice, and peace in the world”.177 Hence, human beings 
are said to possess an objective and inherent property called “dignity” 
and this enables people to make rights claims on others. As the 
declaration is articulated human dignity is ascribed to every human 
being, irrespective of e.g. gender, race, religion, sexuality, or ability. 
Human rights law is also clear about that human rights do not rely upon 
any individual or group characteristics, but simply being human is 
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criterion enough. This is usually called “the standard view” of human 
dignity. The universality claim is in the human rights system linked to 
the idea of equality between individuals, which means that no 
differences between human beings, or the conditions they live in, can 
legitimize discrimination of any kind. However, as many scholars have 
pointed out, the actual meaning of the inherent dignity of human beings 
is extremely vague.178 
Nevertheless, by comparing the historical concept with the 
contemporary one aspect can be clarified, namely that the historical 
concept of dignity appears to be more about perfecting oneself, whereas 
the contemporary account is about how to treat others. The 
distinguishing feature of the contemporary concept is that dignity is a 
value higher than other values. In some views it has a strong 
ontological focus, and is said to be detected by intuition or as a direct 
recognition. Hence, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what human 
dignity is, but in this view it can at least be said to occur in the recog-
nition of the other. In all views, usually inspired by Kant, the absolute 
value of human beings is argued for. What seems to be clear though is 
that human dignity has to do with the worth of the human person and 
that it is inherent in all human beings.179  
3.3.3 Are all human beings valuable? 
Thus far it can be concluded that the dignity narrative informs us that 
human beings are somehow special and valuable in a morally relevant 
way. Various expressions for human dignity are “sanctity of life,” 
“dignity of life,” “intrinsic value of life,” “respect for life,” and they all 
point at the uniqueness of human life. But what does the “realized 
dignity” actually imply? When utilitarian philosophers, such as Helga 
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Kuhse and Peter Singer180 or Torbjörn Tännsjö,181 argue that the 
abortion of a disabled foetus can be defended on the grounds that its 
death will lead to the birth of another child with better prospects of a 
happy life, whose dignity is then realized? The argument is that a 
disabled infant is not yet a person, and therefore its dignity cannot be 
violated, but then the personhood and humanness of the child is at stake 
instead. Against the backdrop of the historical conception of dignity 
and within a culture marked by “hypercognition” – the elevation of the 
capacity to reason –  the temptation to define the nature of personhood 
and humanness according to such criteria is of course convenient. But 
the events of the Second World War points at the evident tension that 
exists between the concept of human dignity and normative ethical 
perspectives, such as utilitarianism, that usually affirm dignity only to 
the degree it is found beneficial to do so. The idea of beneficence can 
potentially justify doing anything to certain individuals, no matter how 
destructive, unless some standard of human dignity prevents that from 
happening.182 
According to the utilitarian account, individuals whose existence 
imposes a burden on the whole must be eliminated to improve the well-
being of the whole. This means that while most people believe that all 
human beings have a higher moral status than non-human animals, 
there is a prevailing disagreement on the moral worth of human beings 
that appear to place a burden on others, such as people with profound 
intellectual disabilities. The general abortion debate actualizes the 
question of whether a foetus ought at all to be viewed as a subject with 
dignity or rights, but the case of prenatal testing and selective abortion 
opens up yet another door relevant for the questions posed in this 
thesis, namely the question whether certain foetuses possess less 
dignity or fewer rights due to some “undesirable” traits. The case of 
selective abortion highlights an important distinction in the discussion 
about human dignity because recognizing that a human foetus has 
dignity does not necessarily require one to recognize the foetus as a 
being with rights. As human dignity is commonly connected to human 
rights, this distinction calls for reflecting upon the relation between 
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rights and dignity, but also the deeper meaning of dignity as such, and 
dignity as a moral value. The practice of selective abortion, as assisted 
suicide too, reveal that there are some dangerous ideas in motion about 
people’s perfection and about the absence of needs that have led to a 
society inaccessible to those who are vulnerable.183 The most pressing 
ethical questions that reproductive technologies give rise to are then: 
what human lives are desirable? What is the place of disability in a 
morally worthy life?  
3.3.4 Challenges in bioethics 
The ethical principle of human dignity is frequently referenced to and 
prioritized in the biomedical sphere. This is seen in e.g. The Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005).184 In the 20th century 
the progress of scientific inventions was rapid, and the discoveries after 
the World War II, such as the discovery of the DNA-code, raised new 
ethical concerns. Bioethics as a discipline emerged in a time with many 
scientific inventions, but also in a time of radical social change.185  
The principle of human dignity has been vastly challenged, mainly 
from a utilitarian perspective.186 A common critique against utilitarian 
approaches to genetic testing and reproductive technologies, for 
instance, is that they have similarities with the eugenic ideology in the 
18th and 19th centuries. Although the “old” eugenics was about who 
could reproduce, and the “new” eugenics is about what kind of 
children that will be born, the presumed weak links in society are to be 
removed in both cases. Yet only in contemporary society the eugenic 
practices are presented as exercises of freedom and choice.187 
In bioethics there are usually two approaches to the basis for human 
dignity.188 Either it is rooted in specific characteristics, or in the simple 
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fact of being human. The former response maintains that human beings 
have dignity because of one or more characteristics that are typically 
human. Usually this view is grounded on the ability to reason, but can 
also be found in other capabilities such as bodily integrity or in the 
ability to sense and imagine things.189 In any case this common view is 
problematic having people with intellectual disabilities in mind, since 
they are denied human dignity simply because of their presumed non-
personhood. It seems as if the worldview that guides the goals of 
Western liberal democracies, not least in the medical context, has 
shaped the priorities so that personhood tends to have a quite specific 
focus. To be a person means that one has to be able to live one’s life 
autonomously and develop one’s potential. Hence, personhood is 
considered necessary for being important and valuable.190  
The latter response maintains that human dignity is granted to all 
human beings that are bound together by belonging to the species Homo 
sapiens. But what difference does it make to be part of the human 
family? For many evolutionary biologists being human is merely a 
product of the natural forces, and for many humanists it is nothing 
more than a factual designator that indicates the value of people 
without any need for transcendence, and some ethicists claim that there 
is no moral significance in belonging to the human species at all. Hence, 
here it comes down to the question of value as such, and therefore it is 
of importance to note that the value of human life has various 
meanings. For example, economic value can be given to human lives as 
an estimation of losses and gains of human lives, or of the present value 
of the expected future earnings for the rest of a person’s life. One can 
also talk about the value of human lives from the perspective of 
contribution to the welfare of others, or of the instrumental value 
human beings have to other people. Another is to talk about the value 
that is attached to the content and fulfillment of life, which usually is 
referred to as an intrinsically good life.191 
Common to these different ways of valuing life is that the values are 
different for different people. The economic value is different for 
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women and men, the instrumental value depends on a person’s 
contributions and social relations. It appears as if only those lives that 
can meet the conditions of subjectivity and autonomy are properly 
called human. And if humanity is questioned in a moral sense, then so 
too is the dignity of that individual. This means that even if the 
principle of human dignity presumes an equal value, even if human 
dignity is defined by the way human beings should be viewed and 
treated, people who are not recognized as human beings can never 
possess dignity.192 
The extensive usage of the concept of dignity creates a chaotic 
landscape of meanings and therefore it is often difficult to grasp exactly 
how human dignity is, or ought to be, used in various situations. This 
becomes particularly evident in the bioethical discourse, and which is 
why bioethicists frequently reject the concept.193 Debates about 
selective abortion or assisted suicide, for instance, reveal that the 
principle of human dignity is claimed as the basis both for 
implementing and prohibiting practices alike. The confusion that 
occurs especially in the arena for medicine is however not surprising if 
one takes a few steps back to look at the broader re-estimation of values 
regarding medicine, health and the human body that has occurred in 
Western societies. Traditionally the practice of medicine was placed 
within a larger moral framework that located bodily health, illness and 
suffering within a broader conception of morally worthy life, which 
means that the dignity of human being was previously not equated 
with bodily excellence. Gradually the practice of medicine has been re-
contextualized in an alternative moral vision in which health and 
physical excellence is at the core. And when mainstream bioethics 
becomes a product of this moral vision, the whole idea about what it 
means to respect the life of another becomes blurry.194  
3.3.5 Discussion 
As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the concept of human dignity 
is a chaotic landscape of views, values and meanings. Therefore, there 
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is, on the one hand, an urgent need to capture human dignity on a 
conceptual level, and reflect upon its practical implications on the 
other. This constructive task is one that I have undertaken particularly 
in article 4. 
There, one aim is to constructively articulate an inclusive concept of 
human dignity in light of the experience of profound intellectual 
disability. To place the starting point in the experience of what is 
frequently regarded the outermost boundary of human being is 
motivated by the purpose of constructing a concept of human dignity 
that can include all human beings. Despite the evident significance of 
human dignity as a core principle in society, some critics argue that the 
concept has lost some of its relevance due to it being frequently used 
synonymously with human rights, and due to the concept being 
increasingly decontextualized from its theological roots. Additionally, 
it can be argued that the values of individualism, autonomy, rationality 
and subjectivity that have come to pervade the Western societies have 
weakened human dignity as a morally relevant concept. While I in this 
chapter have outlined some of the key aspects of the broader dignity 
narrative that comprehends both philosophical and theological 
perspectives, the purpose in article 4 is to recontextualize human 
dignity in theology.  
Because the ability to reason has been one of the main criteria in the 
theological tradition for possessing dignity, the starting point for the 
theological constructive argument put forward is found in experience-
based narratives of profound intellectual disabilities, described in light 
of the Christian narrative of creation. To avoid the risk of articulating a 
sole abstract concept of human dignity, a second step is to discuss the 
practical implications of the concept. In order to do so a disability 
hermeneutic of love is implemented as a route towards an understanding 
of human dignity as a value commitment, and so I argue that an 
increased significance in the concept of human dignity can be 
reclaimed. 
In article 4 I argue that an important premise for possessing human 
dignity is recognition of the humanness and of the personhood in all 
human beings. Because people with intellectual disabilities have 
frequently been denied their personhood, the first step in the reflection 
is to explore what aspects of the Christian narrative of creation that 
enable a view of human being that encompasses the experience of 
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profound intellectual disability. The purpose is not to present the 
Christian doctrine of creation as such, but to point at some aspects of 
the Christian understanding of creatureliness and the biblical claim that 
“the whole creation was good”. Five such aspects are incorporated in 
the analysis and they are: dependency, relationality, a future 
dimension, likeness-difference, and embodiment. The experience-
based narratives serve to shed light on these aspects both with regard 
to human being and to the divine being of God, as any theologically 
rooted concept of human dignity is based upon human beings being 
created in the image of God. If we take seriously that human beings are 
created in God’s image, then the argument is that whenever we say 
something about human experience, we say something important 
about who God is as well. An important point in the view presented is 
that just as the being of God is always open-ended and unpredictable, 
so too is every story about human existence. Therefore the humanness 
and the personhood of people with poor intellectual capabilities cannot 
be denied.  Therefore their dignity cannot be denied.  
The second step of the constructive theological proposal is 
elaborated on in the second part of article 4, and partly in article 3 as 
well, in which I discuss the possible implications of an inclusive view 
of humanity. With the starting-point in Judith Butler’s view of the 
ontology of the body and her view of life as grievable, I argue for a view 
on responsibility for the well-being of others as inherent in the human 
condition, precisely because human being per definition is understood 
as being in mutually interdependent relationships. At the core of 
Butler’s view of life as grievable is that life does not have a worth in 
itself, but that it gets its worth in the specific social context that it is in. 
To say that someone’s life is grievable is to say that (there is a 
possibility) that someone would grieve in case the life would stop 
existing. To best comprehend what such relationships look like, in 
article 4 I attend to the image of the parent-child-relationship in which 
love is usually the most characteristic feature. Because mainstream 
accounts of love do not encompass entering into relationship with the 
one too different from oneself, I discuss the concept of love through the 
lens of a disability hermeneutic.  This reveals a love that is a way of 
being in the world. I describe this as a form of “catalytic relation” 
between human beings, which implies that love is not primarily about 
improving the other or doing something for the other, but about being 
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someone in the life of the other. The narratives of people who love 
people with profound intellectual disabilities are argued to bear a hope 
of redeeming the sense of worthlessness and sorrow for the life that 
never came to be.  
The Christian narrative of creation further points at a love that does 
not cease to exist in the face of disappointment, because God continues 
to love his creation even after the “Fall”. I argue that since goodness 
came before sin, goodness is the primary condition of humanity. While 
brokenness is argued to be inherent in the human condition, it is 
important to consider when and how to speak of it. Sin is here 
understood to appear when people, or systems created by people, act 
in such a way that the suffering of other human beings increase, and 
this has therefore little to do with the will of God or some basic sinful 
feature in only some human beings, such as disability. I argue that 
humanity understood in light of the Christian narrative of creation can 
enable a response towards other human beings that makes possible a 
view of human dignity as a value commitment. To recognize people 
with profound disabilities as human beings with dignity therefore 
requires a social response that expresses: “It is good that you exist.” 
This kind of response demands wilfulness and effort, and it says that 
people with disabilities should be loved in spite of the fact that they are 
a disappointment. In this way I argue that a constructive theological 
account of human dignity as a value commitment can offer new visions 
of human existence and inspire to hopeful practices also in the face of 
people who do not seem to have much to offer.   
Consequently, increased relevance in the principle of human dignity 
relies ultimately upon the social and political networks people live in, 
how they are viewed and treated, and whether the conditions for 
people living a decent life are improved. An inclusive concept of 
human dignity is therefore in the hands of the other, because all human 
life is. Argumentatively I therefore defend the principle of human 
dignity as a value commitment that is embodied in institutions and 
practices, and in small gestures that express: “it is good that you exist.” 
In the conclusion of article 3 I further highlight that the state budgets in 
the Nordic welfare states are presently getting smaller and smaller, and 
that the economic motive for prenatal testing and selective abortion is 
more likely to become more frequently used in the ethical debate, and 
I argue that if, or when, this happens we need to seriously have taken 
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up the discussion about what it means to be human and what the 
concept of human dignity actually implies, and I argue that we need to 
include widened concepts of humanity, solidarity and every human 
beings’ equal worth – at least if we claim to want a fully inclusive 
society. And perhaps, by stretching our imagination, we will find that 
not only can we avoid marginalizing people with disabilities, but also 
experience a richer and more fulfilled life? As I will show in the final 
cultural narrative – the friendship narrative – human fulfilment is 
argued to be found in something else but individual freedom, power, 
autonomous choice, or bodily health, namely in friendship and in our 
capacity to love others.  
3.4 The Friendship Narrative 
As I have outlined thus far, people with disabilities have in various 
ways been neglected throughout history – they have simply not been 
recognized as fully human and thereby excluded from dominant 
cultural narratives about human existence, as well as from resources, 
opportunities, health and life itself. One of the purposes in this thesis is 
to argue for social change and for the importance of recognizing people 
with disabilities as fully human.195 My suggestion is that a counter-
narrative is needed to come to terms with the oppressing and 
discriminating social, political and medical practices that the dominant 
values and the normalcy narrative make possible and legitimize. At the 
core of the proposed counter-narrative is one of the main arguments in 
this thesis, namely that love and friendship do something for a person 
that rights and autonomous choice cannot. Hence, the concept of 
friendship is the most fruitful path I have found to widen the narrow 
conceptions of human being, human dignity, ethics and the good life 
that I suggest marginalize particularly people with profound 
intellectual disabilities.  
In article 3 I argue that the concept of friendship, and precisely 
friendship with people with disabilities, can have immense moral 
significance since I argue there is a transformative structure in an 
ethical perspective that springs from such friendship, but also that such 
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friendship can widen a narrow view of humanity. I also disclose 
throughout this dissertation that narratives as such impact on our 
views and values, and therefore I stress the need for counter-narratives 
that reveal that disability need not be a catastrophe, that people with 
disabilities can be perceived as life-giving, precious gifts that increase 
the quality of life. Since friendship is at the very center of the 
constructive argumentative enquiry of this thesis I will devote 
significantly more space to the friendship narrative than to the 
narratives already presented. Since parent-child relationships are 
especially important in this thesis I pose a view on friendship that can 
fit into these relationships as well. Therefore, a key feature of friendship 
will be vulnerable love. In what follows I will give an overview over 
the history of the concept of friendship and then outline the main 
features of the concept that is the basis for the arguments posed in the 
thesis.  
3.4.1 A brief history of friendship 
During antiquity a number of philosophers devoted their philosophical 
work to the concept of friendship. The words for friendship philia 
(Greek) and amicitia (Latin) were used during this time, although their 
meaning implied close relationships in a much broader sense than the 
contemporary notion of friendship allows. Philia was the word used by 
Aristotle (384-322 BC), whose thinking has impacted various notions of 
friendship throughout history. In philosophical thinking friendship 
was usually closely connected to the word eros – the concept of love that 
desires something from its object – while it within the Christian 
tradition was more commonly connected to word agape – the concept 
of love that is sacrificial and springs from God.196  
Aristotle is thus considered one of the major philosophers of 
friendship, and his philosophy and ethics have influenced many 
contemporary notions of the fundamental values of life, such as: 
friendship, virtue, and the good life, especially as they are formulated 
in The Nichomachean Ethics. The bases of friendship, according to 
Aristotle, is mutuality, affection, and good will. His view was that 
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friendship is the route towards reaching the higher good for 
individuals, and that good friendship is best realized among persons 
that are alike. In fact, he suggested that every kind of change, at least 
negative change, in the persons or the circumstances around the 
friendship would threaten the friendship. However, his assumption 
that something must have the same properties for us to call it the same 
does not resonate well with a life, or a world, that is in constant change. 
Now, the Aristotelian concept of friendship could concern relatives and 
colleagues as well as chosen friends, and he does, unlike many other 
philosophers, not draw a sharp line between friendship and love. 
Friendship is to Aristotle more about ethics and politics, and is 
understood as a relationship that helps the individual strive for justice 
and virtue.197 Aristotle writes: 
 
It [friendship] is crucial in our lives. No one wants to live without 
friends, even if one has all kinds of other good things, do they? Even 
wealthy, influential and powerful people are regarded to be in need 
of friends. Because what good does it do to have such wealth, if one 
does not have the opportunity to do good deeds that first and 
foremost and in its most admirable form will benefit one’s friends?198  
 
While Aristotle points out significant aspects of friendship, such as 
the importance of friendship as a political, ethical and personal 
resource, it needs to be pointed out that friendship was not possible for 
anyone but for free and wise men, which means that the Aristotelian 
friendship excludes women, children, slaves,199 and per definition 
people with disabilities as well.  
The foundation for the European philosophy of friendship was 
established in antiquity, but the 17th and 18th centuries are commonly 
regarded as the classical centuries of the friendship discourse. The 
language of friendship was widely used to describe both equal and 
hierarchical relationships, and because the concept of friendship 
bridged the gap between the public and the private, it was considered 
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to bear a significant political and meaning-making potential. For 
instance, people who were convicted of a crime against someone they 
were friends with, were sentenced to a more moderate punishment 
since friendship was seen as a proof of a person’s goodness.200  
The concept of friendship continued to be politically important into 
the 18th century, but lost some of its significance in the 19th century due 
to resentments among the people and the emergence of the socialist 
ideology. Whereas friendship had previously been the antithesis to war 
and conflict, the society was now largely characterized by divisions 
between groups and classes. The only sphere where friendship 
remained a central concept was in Christian communities or among the 
bourgeois. At the end of the 19th century philanthropists and Christians 
believed that personal commitment and closeness to the weak of the 
society was the key to improving the world, and the imperative of “love 
your neighbour” and friendship were frequently used as important 
expressions in the work for the poor.201 
In modernity the language of friendship disappeared as a political 
concept in other political ideologies built upon freedom, rights, 
democracy, solidarity, welfare, capitalism and economy. According to 
Eva Österberg (2007) this was due to the power and superiority of the 
state becoming more prominent. She further points out that today the 
concept of friendship has gained new significance, because of anti-
authoritative, democratic and egalitarian tendencies in society.202  
3.4.2 A contemporary account of friendship 
Österberg, who has written about the history of friendship, believes 
that the new found interest in friendship is rooted in the increased 
mistrust against modernity and the organisations of the 20th century. 
Drawing on Zygmunt Baumann she contends that while we still in 
many ways live in a modern society, in as much as we have strong 
nation states and democratic political systems and organisations, we 
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have come to be more sceptical about the ability of the state to resolve 
issues of individuals.203  
In contemporary culture, the common notion of friendship is still 
marked by the Aristotelian intuition that says that friendship is possible 
only between persons that are alike. This means that when we talk 
about friendship today, most people understand it to be a phenomenon 
about sameness and social exchange rather than difference, and precisely 
for this reason it might be difficult to recognize friendship between a so 
called normal person and a person with a profound intellectual 
disability as just that. However, friendship is by most people 
considered to be something that every human being desires in life. It is 
commonly viewed as a basic human experience as social beings. 
Therefore, it is considered to belong to the most important spheres of 
life. While people usually choose others as their friends based on 
similar interests, because they belong to the same peer group, have 
much in common on a temporal level, or because they recognize the 
other’s way of responding to the world, I argue that the concept of 
friendship needs to be widened to include a different way of being-in-
relationship. In Aristotelian terms true friendship is about both parties 
getting the same reward out of it, and any other kind of friendship 
would be considered unequal and therefore second best, or even 
untrue,204 and this is simply not compatible with people with 
disabilities who often live in highly asymmetrical relationships.  
Before moving on to a different account of friendship, I would like 
to point out another keyword concerning friendship today, namely that 
friendship is usually based on choice, and specifically as a part of 
people’s individual life projects. In Aristotle’s ethics this notion is 
guided by how to succeed in life as a human being,205 while it in 
contemporary liberal societies can be said to be about succeeding to 
“live in a freedom that is shaped by one’s own preferences”.206 Hence 
choosing friends is an activity of freedom that contributes to the good 
life. However, precisely because freedom in contemporary society has 
largely been turned into an object of choice, most people are not capable 
                                                     
203 Österberg 2007, 27-29. 
204 Reinders 2015, 340-346; Swinton 2007a, 220-221; Österberg 2007, 43-47. 
205 Aristotle 1988, 222-228. 
206 Reinders 2015, 346. 
89 
of perceiving life as good unless it is chosen. In this view friendship is 
true and good merely in case it is chosen.207  
Against the presented view of friendship, it is probably not clear 
how friendship could be a fruitful route towards the inclusion of people 
with disabilities, since it appears as if the prevalent conception of 
friendship is placed within the same normalcy narrative as parenthood 
and human dignity previously discussed. People with disabilities are 
rarely chosen as friends because they are too different from anyone who 
considers themselves “normal”, and further because their social 
position of being isolated in institutions or group homes makes it 
further difficult for them to be chosen as friends.208 Increased political 
and human rights do certainly bring more fulfillment to the lives of 
people with disabilities, but friendship brings a moral resource into the 
debate about reproductive technologies, human dignity and human 
being that rights and justice do not. Therefore we need to explore in 
what ways people with disabilities can be included in our lives as 
friends, and not just as citizens.209 Jean Vanier writes: 
 
Justice renders us to open to respect for others. Friendship goes 
further. Nothing pushes us quite as radically beyond ourselves as 
friendship. So far, we have spoken of happiness as a subjective and 
solitary activity that involves an attitude of openness to the world 
but that makes the subject alone responsible for and the beneficiary 
of his own perfection. With friendship we see another dimension 
emerge, giving a new slant to happiness.210  
 
In The Normal Chaos of Love (1995) Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-
Gernsheim explore the ambiguous nature of personal relationships and 
family patterns in the ever changing social landscape. They argue that 
the traditions, rules and guidelines that used to govern personal 
relationships no longer apply, and that the one thing that love is the 
one driving force for close relationships in whatever form they take. 
They suggest that because the world is overwhelming, impersonal and 
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abstract, love has become increasingly important.211 Hence, to love 
someone involves regarding life as meaningful, and it seems as if the 
most important aspect of finding one’s life as meaningful springs from 
personal relationships, whether friendship, family or lovers. 
Friendship is thus a basic and vital human relationship that forms the 
social fabric of our lives. We discover our identity through our 
friendships; we gain our sense of value and place in the world, and 
learn what it means to participate in community. Friends help us to 
recognize one another and the world.212 Just as the concept of human 
dignity might reach further than human rights with regards to the 
social responses to people with disabilities (and people in general), so 
too can friendship, I believe. But because friendship pushes us radically 
beyond ourselves, as Vanier suggests in the quote above, I believe that 
the concept of friendship can transform our values, our responses, and 
the way we treat each other. In what follows I will negotiate a different 
concept of friendship that sets the foundation for how it is used as a 
counter-narrative, or counter-logic, in this thesis. 
3.4.3 A counter-narrative of friendship 
As suggested above, if friendship is to be viewed as a tenable core of 
the counter-narrative I am proposing it has to be reimagined. It is in 
this endeavour I argue that a disability perspective, as well as a 
Christian theological perspective and a philosophy of love is sufficient. 
In the Christian narrative Jesus’s relationships were marked by 
unconditional acceptance, solidarity with the poor and marginalized, 
and commitment to others. Since these kinds of relationships – 
friendships – are at the core of Jesus’ being in the world,213 one could 
suggest that friendship is the very sign of God’s presence in the world, 
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and a sign of God’s image in human beings,214 which is what I suggest 
in articles 2 and 4. John Swinton writes: 
 
Human beings are social creatures, made in the image of a social God 
who is trinity; a God who is love and relationship in essence. God is 
a community of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, eternally indwelling 
one another in a community of love. It is only natural that creatures 
made in the image of God should seek after relationships in all of 
their various forms.215 
 
Christian friendship thus reveals something different than the 
Aristotelian notion of friendship. It reveals a friendship that is not 
based on likeness or social exchange, and therefore makes “second 
hand” friendships impossible. Jesus chose to befriend the outcasts in 
society, he was committed to them, he accepted them, he loved them – 
and this way of relating to the world is central to human existence in 
the Christian narrative. As Jesus in the service of the foot washing (John 
13:14-15) sets the example of a form of authority that should define a 
community characterized by love, he points at a friendship with a 
reversed logic. Not only does Jesus introduce a model of friendship that 
transcends the boundaries of utility and freedom. He also points at a 
friendship that is based on the principle of grace, and on the shared 
knowledge that every human being is recognized by God as God’s 
friend, which calls for recognizing the world and others within it in 
ways that differ greatly from the assumed norm.216 This concept is thus 
related to a specific notion of love as well. 
In What We Talk About When We Talk About Love (2008), Camilla 
Kronqvist asserts that every encounter with another human being 
encompasses a compromise of one’s own will, at least the possibility of 
it being compromised, and in this sense love itself limits the freedom of 
the individual. This means that while love does indeed make claims on 
the individual, it also creates opportunities to act in ways one could not 
without love. From this perspective love places the individual in a 
world in which people matter, in which they are precious and 
meaningful, which in turn allows the individual to matter and mean 
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something to others. Hence love brings in an element of irrationality to 
the concept of friendship, because love does not fit into rational 
thinking about what justifies our actions. But the desire to have rational 
grounds for all meaningful human interaction can also be argued to be 
an expression of the fear that our lives would otherwise be rendered 
contingent, and therefore the need to have good reasons for befriending 
someone is usually defended. But is there not something strangely odd 
about first having to clarify the qualities of a person – what the person 
is – in order to explain why a person can form relationships with 
others? As Kronqvist suggests, the things that people commit 
themselves to in friendship are usually not bound to the characteristics 
of a person, but are rather aspects of the relationship. It is in the 
relationship that the person emerges.217 Therefore, no characteristics 
can take away the vulnerability that is built into every relationship, and 
in this sense all human beings are strangers before love and friendship. 
Mikael Lindfelt (2010) stresses that the notion of being strangers can 
work as an important reminder of how the other cannot be controlled 
in a mutual encounter. He emphasizes that estrangement is not 
primarily a description of the other, but that it hints at the impossibility 
of holding a hegemonic attitude towards the other, whether this 
attitude is built on a presumed objectivity. The emphasis on 
estrangement also points at the very subject itself, in the sense that 
every person is variously constituted by the complex and manifold 
relationships one is in, and by the fact that it is not always clear who a 
person is. Sometimes I do not understand why I myself react the way I 
do, and this confusion must also be placed in relation to others. By 
encountering others it becomes clearer who I am, and perhaps who I 
want to become. Estrangement can furthermore be a reminder of that 
every genuine encounter is about the paradoxes in the openness for 
changing and being changed without any clear goals in mind on the 
one hand, and the constant movement between being close and distant 
on the other.218      
 From these deliberations the concept of friendship emerges as an 
ethically motivated ideal, and the category of friendship becomes a 
mutual part of the existential structure of human personal existence. 
                                                     
217 Kronqvist 2008, 136-137, 157-163. 
218 Lindfelt 2010, 201. 
93 
The movement from stranger to friendship is thus from a relational 
perspective a movement towards the creative opportunities of life. The 
moral demand that is placed upon human beings in friendship and love 
no longer appears as a problem. Quite the opposite, seeing someone as 
an obligation might already be an expression of love. The recognition 
of something as an obligation exposes a commitment to the other, 
which can be seen as a natural form of communication involving a 
dialectic tension between differentiation and fellowship. Hence, 
coming to know someone is not done on my own.219 
While friendship from an Aristotelian point of view is an activity of 
freedom, the counter-narrative of friendship that I propose is a different 
form of activity, namely a “dynamic activity within which we seek to 
live virtuous lives worthy of being called truly human”.220 Friendship 
is thus not something we can choose or do alone, but a skill that is 
learned through encountering the stranger – the one we do not know. 
And as friendship is not based on likeness the meaning of friendship 
becomes truly contextual.221 Although the Christian concept of 
friendship has been formed through a variety of dilemmas, not least in 
the early Christian monasteries where it was largely debated whether 
nuns and monks could enter into friendship, or whether friendship was 
possible between people in different hierarchical positions, or whether 
people within the monasteries could befriend people in the outside 
world,222 I maintain that the Christian narrative frames friendship in a 
way that makes sense of encountering the one’s least like us.  
While many in liberal societies are not ascribing themselves to a 
Christian value system, it can be argued that friendship framed in the 
Christian narrative entails recognizing one another in constructive and 
health-bringing ways that has the power to resist bad social practices.223 
As Swinton (2000) asserts, Christian friendship is both centripetal and 
centrifugal, which means that it reaches inward to contribute to creating 
a loving an inclusive community, and outward to embrace and stand 
with the outcasts.224 Now, it can be argued that this is indeed a very 
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radical choice, and that this model of friendship is radically dependent 
on liberal values such as freedom and choice. But as we shall see, it is 
quite the opposite. In this thesis I use the community model of L’Arche 
to show how befriending people with disabilities can widen both a 
narrow conception of morality and what it means to be human. While 
I in article 3 make my case for the practical implications of such 
friendship, I will here tend more specifically to what friendship looks 
like in the L’Arche communities and how such friendship is connected 
to the idea of divine providence.  
3.4.4 Friendship in L’Arche 
When Jean Vanier, the founder of L’Arche, in 1964 asked two men from 
an institution for men with intellectual disabilities,225 to come and live 
with him, he had no agenda other than to answer to what he considered 
a call. As he visited the institution, and they time and time again asked 
him if he would come back, if he considered himself their friend, he 
experienced them to cry out for relationship with him. He saw a beauty 
in these men that he thought was destroyed in this large and violent 
institution. This beauty he regarded as God’s presence. The fact that 
these abused and wounded people had the ability to be open for 
friendship and community was to Vanier a sign of God’s presence. The 
fact that these people, despite their obvious physical and intellectual 
limitations, were so gifted with regards to building relationships, was 
to him nothing less than a witness of what is really at the core of human 
being in the Christian narrative of creation – friendship and being in 
relation. And this basic philosophy, which still is an elementary view 
in the L’Arche communities, demonstrates that community life is not 
about doing morally good deeds for people with disabilities, but simply 
to respond to the presence of God in other people. And this is how the 
notion of providence is connected to friendship; by revealing himself in 
the needs of others, God invites people to respond and act. In this view 
every human being that we encounter is a providential gift to us.226 
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In Christian literature people with disabilities are frequently used as 
means to making the so called normal people morally better, and 
sometimes this is precisely what the L’Arche communities are criticized 
for. But such critique only reveals the misconceptions of what L’Arche 
is really about – which is being-in-relationship – and this critique 
highlights the difficulties in seeing beyond an Aristotelian concept of 
friendship. Instead, Hans S. Reinders suggest, friendship has to be 
evaluated against the idea of an ultimate end, which I discuss in article 
2 in relation the concept of health. In a theological perspective moral 
life is always about responding to God’s offer of friendship, which 
means that friendship precedes human actions. In this view human 
actions are a response to how we imagine God responding to the other. 
A key point here is that this kind of friendship follows a three-way-
logic, rather than a two-way-logic and that means that even though 
befriending a person with a disability – which seems irrational in a two-
way-logic – might appear as if the person with a disability is used as a 
means when he/she is not.227 
The question is, then, how to figure out how to receive the other so 
that the presence of people with disabilities will appear as a gift that 
enables us to learn what our unshaken belief in our abilities usually 
prevents us from seeing. People tend to believe that goodness in a 
person merely is revealed to us by examples of greatness and 
perfection, while doing so means that small gestures are overlooked. 
And yet usually it is the small things that reveal the greatest wonders 
of love.228 Kronqvist writes:  
 
It is easy to feel awe and amazement in front of astounding beauty 
or goodness when nothing is demanded of us, but much more 
difficult to respond to the demands love makes on us in the grittier 
cases.229 
 
What Kronqvist suggests is that the difficulty to love the “grittier 
cases” might not be the issue at all, but instead one’s own ability to love 
appears as the issue. While I do not suggest that disabilities make up a 
better reason for loving, they can, however, more clearly reveal the 
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demands that love makes on us. In the face of disability the reality of 
relationship and the responsibility that is in such relationship is 
undeniable. The love that demands, needs, and takes effort might easily 
be forgotten in the life of independent people who appear to be without 
needs.  The willingness to accept an image of perfection as a reason for 
love reveals in itself a temptation in love. The assumption that one 
could not possibly love a person with a disability reveals, perhaps, 
more about common assumptions of perfection than it does about love. 
To make judgements about desirable objects of love says more about 
ourselves wanting to be judges over love, rather than to be judged by 
it.230 In L’Arche, friendship is not dependent on skills, abilities or 
personal achievements but upon receiving. In everyday life 
relationships are built with people with disabilities in the little things. 
Jean Vanier writes: 
 
Our lives in l’Arche are disarmingly simple. We often say that half 
the day is taken up with dirtying things and the other half with 
cleaning up! That is not entirely true because we also have work, 
celebrations, meals and prayer. But that does say something about 
the littleness and ordinariness of our lives. This is particularly 
evident when we are with people who have severe handicaps. They 
need a lot of presence and caring in all the vital acts of the body: 
bathing, toilet, clothing, feeding and so on. Many of them cannot be 
left alone during the day, even for short periods; their anguish is too 
great. Much of our life is situated around touch: holding them, 
bathing them, playing with them. Of course there is no place for 
interesting conversation. Play and laughter is the only 
communication possible. We experience communion with them 
around all the very little things-to-do of each day.231 
 
Often Vanier says that we are all called to do, not extraordinary 
things, but ordinary things with extraordinary love. And his 
description of the everyday life of L’Arche bears witness of precisely 
that. When Vanier in 2015 won the Templeton Prize for his work in 
L’Arche he emphasized in his speech  
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To be with is to live side by side, it is to enter into mutual 
relationships of friendship and concern. It is to laugh and to cry 
together, it is to mutually transform each other. Each person becomes 
a gift for the other, revealing to each other that we are all part of a 
huge and wonderful family, the family of God. We are all profoundly 
the same as human beings, but also profoundly different, we all have 
our special gifts and unique mission in our lives. This wonderful 
family, from its earliest origins and since then with all those who 
have been spread over this planet from generation to generation, is 
composed of people of different cultures and abilities, each of whom 
have their strength and their weakness, and each of whom is 
precious.232 
 
People with disabilities do perhaps not have intellectual gifts, but 
they have a unique gift of the heart. They do not aspire to be successful 
in their achievements, but they long for personal relationships of love 
that can give them life and meaning. The friendship in L’Arche reveals 
what a so called “loving gaze” is really about, namely allowing the 
other to be other and not attempt to change him or her according to 
one’s own preferences. The friendship in L’Arche reveals that seeing 
someone as beautiful demands all senses. Kronqvist (2008) suggests 
that one comes to recognize someone’s individuality not only through 
spending time observing the person, but by touching and feeling 
someone’s movement, by feeling someone’s hands, by listening to the 
tone of their voice, and so on, all of which are at the core of friendship 
in L’Arche. This is the dialogical character of a relationship, previously 
described.233  
The friendship in L’Arche is not true because it is mirroring the 
sameness of persons, but because the people who have chosen to 
become friends of people with disabilities have been transformed 
through befriending the rejected.234 This is the vision of friendship that 
I will argue can serve as a foundation for resisting the indignity of 
people with (profound intellectual) disabilities.   
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3.4.5 Discussion 
In this final chapter before my concluding discussion I have discussed 
the concept of friendship and being-in-relationship as the basic concept 
for constructing a counter-narrative of morality and human being. In 
article 3 I contrast the narrow moral framework of morality and human 
being with the stories about friendships in the communities of L’Arche. 
The L’Arche communities are brought forth as an example of how 
befriending people with disabilities can challenge mainstream ethical 
narratives and widen the narrow view of morality and what it means 
to be human.  In L’Arche people with and without disabilities share 
their lives in a family like setting, and those who have lived in L’Arche 
reveal that befriending people with disabilities has been a catalyst for 
moral transformation and a route towards a view of human being that 
allows people with intellectual disabilities to touch and open hearts.  
The argument for drawing on the stories of L’Arche is that I maintain 
that by keeping the discussion within a narrow medical framework, 
people with disabilities will always be underdogs because of their 
chromosomal deviations or medical “defects”. Their quality of life can 
never make sense in that context. The friendship account becomes 
important because while the Disability-rights movement and the 
greater disability community has fought hard for the rights of people 
with disabilities, the strict focus on empowerment, self-awareness and 
self-advocacy continues to exclude people with profound intellectual 
disabilities. They can never represent themselves, make autonomous 
choices or express their dreams and wishes. This means that if we want 
to have a truly inclusive society, where all individuals are of equal 
worth, we need to widen our conceptions and look for further 
perspectives on how to perceive life as a human being. This is where 
the culture of L’Arche can be helpful. 
The most important goal of L’Arche is to build community. 
Community in the L’Arche context means groupings of people who 
have chosen to leave their own environment to live with others, to work 
from a new vision of human beings and their relationships with each 
other and God. The L’Arche communities are also clearly defined by 
acknowledging the brokenness of human beings. Many people go to 
live in a L’Arche community to do a good sacrificial thing living with 
people with disabilities, but usually discover that living in community 
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is not about doing things for others, but to learn how to receive and be 
with. This way of thinking certainly requires an acceptance that we are 
all people in need – we are all dependent on other people.  L’Arche is 
not primarily an example of an ideal way of living realized by morally 
superior people, but rather an example of learning a deeper truth about 
oneself, God and others.   
Hence, bringing forth the concept of friendship, and the example of 
L’Arche, resonate well with the theological view on life that I propose 
in article 2 in which the idea of proximate ends and an ultimate end is 
included. The ultimate end is here articulated to be communion with 
God, and all other life goals are to be evaluated against this end. While 
communion with God does involve the relationship between human 
beings and God, it is most evidently expressed in the inter-human 
relationships that are so intimately connected that they in a theological 
view are analogous to the Triune relationship. The disability 
perspective sheds light on troublesome aspects of life usually perceived 
as lack of health or failure to flourish as human beings, mistakenly 
attributed to individual and medical causes, rather than social, political, 
and economical ones. The disability perspective demonstrates that 
human well-being and flourishing entail a wide range of different 
experiences, which challenges accounts of diversity wrongly identified 
as pathology.  
I argue that theology has resources that can transform the way the 
absence of health is commonly experienced and explained, and a 
particular theological concept of health presents possibilities to be the 
kind of communities that offer people a safety-net for bodies and 
identities that are at risk of marginalization, and the resources to bear 
what otherwise would be unbearable. Through this view, I suggest, a 
space is created where it is possible to see the value of even the most 
broken body, which presses people to act differently and take a 
different stance. And this is ultimately what a liberating account of 
health can provide – more tenderness, more love, and no “I” without a 
“we”.  
In article 3 I argue that L’Arche can be viewed as an alternative 
cultural setting in which widened perspectives on disability and 
human life can grow, and I propose that attention to changing attitudes 
could be a legitimate complement to legislation and rights and that the 
presence of people with disabilities in our societies could make a 
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positive contribution, and possibly even change how practices like 
prenatal testing are implemented. I suggest that if people with 
disabilities would be welcomed to actually participate in peoples’ lives, 
though friendships, the moral culture could possibly be changed in a 
way that regulations would no longer matter in the same way. Jean 
Vanier and L’Arche show that the vision and realization of values are 
not always a result of planning, strategy or theoretical ideas, but a result 
of life lived.  This means that the insights drawn from L’Arche about 
what it means to be human and human fulfilment do not spring from 
great thoughts or moral principles, but from encountering people with 
a wide range of abilities and gifts.  
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4 Concluding Discussion  
In this thesis I have demonstrated that far too much of our physical, 
social and cultural spheres are designed in ways that propagate 
patterns of harmful exclusion for people with disabilities. The 
persistent assumption that people with disabilities are the undesirable 
“other” in society is argued to be a consequence of such patterns. Since 
reproduction concerns most people, in one way or another, the practice 
of prenatal testing is argued to be a major source of expressed notions 
about what it means to be human and to have a human body. For this 
reason I have used prenatal testing as a kind of case-study, or simply 
as an example of how certain moral truths and knowledge are 
produced in this particular context. By implementing a feminist 
disability perspective, drawn mainly from disability studies literature 
encompassing feminist approaches and disability theology, as well as 
experience-based narratives of disability, I have identified some key 
features in these patterns of exclusion. While there are certainly other 
spheres of life in which such patterns occur, I have focused on how they 
can be identified in the cultural narratives of normalcy, parenthood, 
dignity, and friendship, and therefore the subtasks and the themes of the 
articles have been chosen accordingly. Cultural narratives are here 
understood as stories we generally live by, stories that help us make 
sense of ourselves in the world, stories that inform our lives, but also 
limits our actions and ways of responding to other people and to the 
challenges life throws at us. Because these narratives are argued to give 
us a sense of security, I have called them comforting narratives as well. 
These narratives are thus argued to have immense moral significance 
in our lives.  
The problematic notions that most evidently occur in the narratives 
can be gathered together in the following six claims: (1) disability is equal 
to catastrophe and suffering, and thus incompatible with happiness and 
good quality of life; (2) people with disabilities are defined, named and 
judged on the basis of their genetic condition, and thus always viewed as 
disabled first and people second; (3) people with intellectual disabilities are 
not persons or fully human, because they presumably lack in capacity to 
reason; (4) the elimination of (people with) disabilities lead to social 
improvement, since neither parents nor society would be economically 
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or socially burdened by them, and since increased health is a sign of 
societal advancement; (5) disability is the ultimate threat against the liberal 
value system in which autonomy, individual freedom and choice, rights, 
utility, productivity, efficiency and success are important ideals; and 
last, but perhaps most problematic, (6) the idea of inclusive human dignity 
is granted only people who fit into the normalcy paradigm, hence people with 
disabilities are of less worth than the so called normal people.  
By discussing various historical and contemporary notions of 
embodiment, health, reproduction, and dignity I have exemplified 
ways in which a narrow view of both humanity and morality manifests 
itself, and I have pointed at the need for an ethical framework that helps 
us think critically about the social implications of difference, and about 
the ways certain people are often seen as more valuable than others. In 
the reminder of this chapter I will present some of the main features of 
the constructive responses I have proposed to these claims.   
In society there is a strong underlying assumption that disability is 
equal to suffering. Ideas of suffering have a long history in religion, 
ethics, and health care, particularly in discourses about the good life. 
The alleviation, prevention and elimination of suffering have thus come 
to be important goals of health care and biomedical science. Because 
health care professionals are the dominant gatekeepers of health, the 
medical understanding of disability and the normalcy narrative enforce 
the presumption that disability is a catastrophe to be avoided at all cost. 
While various emancipatory groups, such as the women’s movement, 
have tried to occupy the gatekeeping role, these have tended to simply 
focus on moving the power from one place to another without 
thoroughly questioning the oppressive elements of power in the first 
place. Therefore I argue that the gatekeeping role of health need to be 
moved to another place, tentatively to that of theology, but also that 
this project need to consistently be self-reflexive and self-critical of its 
own relationship to power.  
In something called the Biocultures Manifesto, Lennard J. Davis and 
David B. Morris (2007) write that biology, which at times is used as a 
metaphor for science, is as intrinsic to the embodied state of the readers 
and writers as history and culture are intrinsic to the professional 
bodies of knowledge known as science and biology. They suggest that 
to think of science without including a historical a cultural analysis 
would be like thinking of the literary text without the surrounding and 
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embedding weave of discursive knowledges, active or dormant at 
particular moments. The biological without the cultural, or the cultural 
without the biological is doomed to be reductionist at best and 
inaccurate at worst. Social constructionism is self-limited and 
inaccurate if it implies that social facts may be entirely dissociated from 
biological facts. Therefore the biological must work in a dialectical 
relation with the cultural.235 While I do argue that disability in large is 
a social, historical and cultural construction, I also want to underline 
that biology does play an important part in the discourse about 
disability, since disability is indeed an embodied experience as well. 
The main problem about medicine being in a dominant gatekeeping 
role of health, and by effect of disability, is the meaning that usually is 
ascribed to the biological.  
For this reason a crucial route towards reimagining disability, and 
there through the widening of the medical understanding of human 
being, is the implementation of experience-based narratives of 
disability. I argue that bodies that are radically different from the norm 
can work to produce new knowledge about human existence. 
Nevertheless, many of the narratives brought forth in this thesis do 
now allow us to look away from the fact that there are many disabilities 
that cause some serious pain and suffering, but these narratives also 
reveal that pain and suffering do not constitute the entire human 
existence. Those who live with chronic pain witness that they have had 
to learn how to live with pain, and therefore I argue that to think 
seriously and constructively about suffering, one has to deprive it of 
meaning. While there is an evident risk involved, however, in doing so, 
which is the risk of trivializing another person’s very real experience of 
pain as a tragic and horrible aspect of life, I argue that there is a much 
greater risk in not doing so, which is the risk of ascribing meaning to 
pain and suffering. And since I argue that the latter is one of the main 
reasons to why people with disabilities have been, and are, victims of 
harmful exclusion, I believe that the former is one worth taking. But 
here the methodological move to listen to the stories of people in pain, 
and taking them seriously, become crucial because it only through 
them we can begin to better understand what it means to accept 
suffering and pain as inescapable aspects of human being. In the project 
                                                     
235 Davis & Morris 2007, 411-418. 
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of rethinking the relations between bodies and selves, subjects and 
society, these narratives can teach consciousness a certain kind of 
freedom from the sufferings and limitations of the body. Because, after 
all, we are all at risk of becoming disabled at one point or another in 
our lives.  
Now, in addition to the narrative account of disability I have 
proposed a theological account of human being and health that places 
the inter-corporeal and relational aspect of human existence at the 
centre. This perspective allows for a view that sees interpersonal 
relationships as both necessary and determent of human well-being, and 
it allows a view of health that does not equate disability with the whole 
of human existence. The theological account of human beings as 
creatures further underlines in what ways limitation, dependency and 
relationality are inherent in the human condition, which calls for a 
certain mindset and attitude towards the other. A body in pain needs 
the care of others. Therefore the suffering of another person calls us to 
act in solidarity and love, because that is the moral demand of being-
in-relationship. When we recognize the humanness and personhood in 
the other, in the disabled, the moral demand is to ease the conditions 
for the other, and help make the other’s life livable. This calls us to sit 
with the one who suffers, and bear what otherwise would be 
unbearable. I maintain that people with disabilities bears witness of 
tough human beings, rather than some extraordinary fragility. The 
people who are constantly exposed by their vulnerability and need of 
help reveal to those who are desperately trying to hide their own 
vulnerability that life can be good as it is. Therefore disabilities witness 
the beauty of interdependence rather than horrific isolation. From this 
perspective living life with a disability does not prevent bright future 
prospects; it does not exclude happiness or quality of life, which brings 
us to the question of dignity. 
I argue that theology can transform the way the absence of health is 
commonly experienced and explained, and consequently a door is 
opened for a view of an inclusive concept of human dignity as well. I 
argue that increased relevance in the principle of human dignity relies 
ultimately upon the social and political networks people live in, how 
they are viewed and treated, and whether the conditions for people 
living a decent life are improved. An inclusive concept of human 
dignity is therefore in the hands of the other, because all human life is. 
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Argumentatively I therefore defend the principle of human dignity as 
a value commitment that is embodied in institutions and practices, and 
in small gestures that express: “it is good that you exist.” This mindset 
is in the context of this thesis explained through the concept of 
friendship or simply being-in-relationship. The true nature of 
friendship, I suggest, will not be found in human activities that are 
centered on self-justification or “being-in-competition-with.”236 Instead, 
it is found in the view of human being as inter-dependent, and in a view 
of love as vulnerable. Such love places my own happiness in the hands 
of the other, which opens up the possibility that I may lose the ground 
beneath my feet in losing you. By not trying to determine what 
something should be like, or who someone ought to be in order to be 
valued, love and friendship can be said to open up life itself,237 and as 
it were, friendship can be seen as a route towards challenging 
mainstream ethical narratives and positions a catalyst for moral 
transformation.  
Despite claims about how characteristics and capabilities are not 
criteria for possessing dignity, it is evident that there is a strong 
tendency in culture, especially within health care, to presume that 
people with disabilities are of less (moral, economic, human) worth 
than those who fit into the normalcy paradigm. I argue that if we take 
serious that human dignity and human rights are core values in society, 
then we must make sure that all forms of human existence are governed 
by these values. If we claim to ensure the protection of all human 
beings, then we simply cannot uphold practices that compromise and 
question the worth of certain people. Instead we need to recognize and 
embrace all human beings in the way human embodied existence is 
actually lived, and shape the society accordingly, and not the other way 
around so that human beings have to desperately try to fit into a 
normative image of human being. The history cannot be changed, but 
just as the history has shaped the present, so do present actions shape 
the future. The practice of prenatal testing and selective abortion as 
they are implemented and explained to date is not creating a future in 
which the diversity of human beings is celebrated. Rather, the eugenic 
logic that underpins such practices is creating a future in which some 
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people are worthy and dignified and some are not. Rather than creating 
a world according to our preconceived notion of what could be 
beautiful in it, we should be discovering the beauty of the world, by 
accepting the unpredictability in whatever forms and shapes it may 
take.  
Inclusive communities are places of welcome. A society that 
welcomes people with disabilities values their presence and misses 
them if they are absent. Inclusion is thus not merely about accepting 
someone once they are already here, but about saying that the world is 
a more beautiful place because of their presence. Since this is what most 
people want for themselves – to be recognized and valued – inclusion 
is not about any single individual, or any specific minority group, but 
it involves everyone.  Inclusion is thus not primarily a political program 
but a mindset and an attitude. It is a way of thinking, and a way of 
treating others. Therefore there is a moral significance in the different 
ways of relating to each other. Hence, the idea of inclusion entails the 
premise that everyone is of value, and everyone has a right to belong.  
4.1 Endnote and prospects for future research 
One scholar who has influenced my thinking greatly is Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson who is commonly regarded the pioneer for 
combining a disability perspective with feminist theory. In fact, she is 
the one who has coined the very term feminist disability studies. In a 
postscript to her widely read and reprinted article “Integrating 
Disability, Transforming Feminist Theory” (2011), she describes how 
she for the first time used the expression feminist disability theory as if 
it was an existent critical discourse that she was addressing rather than 
something she was working out for herself. Her aim was to show that 
disability theory was everywhere in feminist studies if one would just 
know how to look for it. Her hope was to establish an academic 
specialization that scholars would put on their CVs, that departments 
at universities would list it as a job description, that colleagues would 
use as a professional self-description. I guess Garland-Thomson has 
inspired me to dream of something similar in the process of writing this 
thesis. In the Introduction I write that I have found no better description 
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for my work than feminist disability theology. Presently there is no 
established academic specialization termed feminist disability 
theology, other than by brief mentioning, although there are a few 
feminist theologians who elaborate on the issue of disability.238 Hence, 
in the spirit of Garland-Thomson I will “send out [the] words into the 
world as an act of faith that they will do the cultural work [I] intend 
them to do.”239  
Just as there has been immense harmful power in naming people 
with disabilities as deviant, deficient and undesirable, I believe there 
can be liberating power in explicitly naming one’s research feminist 
disability theology.  Many established disability theologians are men 
who do not pay much attention to the specific concerns that the issue 
of disability raises for women, nor do they regard the important 
emancipatory approaches that feminists have developed over the years 
of struggle for equality. For this reason an explicit feminist disability 
theology is much needed. While this thesis serves to fill a tiny part of 
that void, there are many important issues that I have not been able to 
include. In the remaining part of this thesis I will propose a few subjects 
that are of interest in future research. 
One such subject of interest would be intimate relationships 
between people with disabilities, especially in relation to theological 
accounts of love and marriage. The implementation of the emerging 
accounts of queer theology would here be of value since there are many 
important connections between heteronormativity and the normalcy 
narrative in culture. Connected to this question would also be the issue 
of the sexuality of girls and women with disabilities, which is a highly 
overlooked matter in much disability research. Against recent reports 
on the increased violence against people with disabilities in care homes 
and institutions, as well as reports suggesting that women with 
disabilities are in a 2-4 time greater danger than able-bodied women of 
being subjected to sexual violence, it would be interesting to follow in 
Vappu Viemerö’s, associate professor in psychology, footsteps and 
study various aspects of violence and disability, but from an ethical 
                                                     
238 Nancy Eiesland, Sharon Betcher and Deborah Beth Creamer are the ones I have 
found to use the description feminist disability theology in their research. See Schumm 
2010; also Disability Theology. 
239 Garland-Thomson 2011, 43. 
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point of view. As the issues of guilt and shame have been central in the 
discourse about rape and sexual violence, a theological perspective 
would be interesting to incorporate as well. In this thesis I have pointed 
out that theologies of wholesomeness are highly problematic in relation 
to disability, and in this matter it would be interesting to look further 
into both the Christian tradition and contemporary theological 
accounts. Eschatological perspectives on “human becoming” or 
perceptions about disability in life after this could be fruitful. 
In the recent book Childhood and Disability in the Nordic Countries. 
Being, Becoming, Belonging (2015) the authors express that while the 
living conditions and life quality for children with disabilities and their 
families are quite good in the Nordic countries, compared to many 
other places in the world, there are still problematic issues to resolve. 
There seems to be a gap between the formal system and the practical 
reality. There is poor access to information and fragmentation in 
services. In the future there will also likely be widened social 
inequalities and increasing ethnic diversity, and these issues are 
therefore important in future research as well.  
As for biomedical technologies, such as prenatal testing, there is still 
work to be done. The methods for testing are constantly developed into 
more sophisticated forms, and the legislation appears to be far behind 
these new developments in many countries. An ongoing discussion 
about the goals end purposes of these practices ought to be encouraged 
in a variety of research fields and experience-based narratives of 
families that have a member with disabilities should be properly 
included. I strongly believe that more and better knowledge will 
emerge once the biomedical sciences and the humanities align 
themselves in research. As Davis & Morris (2007) contend in their 
Bioculture Manifesto, the strict divide between “soft” and “hard” 
sciences needs to be abandoned in present day research on questions 
concerning human life.  The presumption that the humanities are the 
realm of values and the sciences are the realm of facts is simply not true. 
None of these can be fully understood without knowing the historical, 
social, cultural, discursive fields surrounding the data. 
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Svensk sammanfattning 
Den här avhandlingen åskådliggör att en stor del av våra fysiska, 
sociala och kulturella sfärer är utformade på ett sätt som möjliggör 
marginalisering av människor med funktionsnedsättningar. Ett viktigt 
syfte med avhandlingen är därför att visa att den till synes orubbliga 
föreställningen att människor med funktionsnedsättningar är 
oönskade i samhället är en konsekvens av sådana marginaliserande 
tanke- och handlingsmönster. Eftersom familjebildning och 
reproduktion är en central aspekt av många människors liv kan 
fosterdiagnostikpraxisen sägas vara ett relevant exempel för att fånga 
in grundläggande föreställningar om vad det innebär att vara 
människa och att ha en mänsklig kropp. Därför diskuteras i 
avhandlingen fosterdiagnostiken som ett slags ”case-study”, eller som 
ett exempel på hur kunskap och vissa moraliska sanningar produceras 
i denna specifika kontext. Genom att implementera en så kallad 
”feministisk funktionsnedsättningsteologi” tillsammans med 
erfarenhetsbaserade narrativ om funktionshinder identifierar jag några 
kärnpunkter i givna marginaliseringsmönster. Trots att sådana 
mönster framträder i en mängd olika livssfärer, lyfter jag specifikt fram 
kulturella narrativ om normalitet, föräldraskap, människovärde (dignity) 
och vänskap. Med kulturella narrativ avser jag berättelser som 
människor generellt lever i enlighet med och som informerar 
människors liv, men också som berättelser som begränsar människors 
handlingar och sätt att reagera på andra människor. Jag visar att 
narrativ är moraliskt viktiga eftersom de ger människor trygghet och 
säkerhet, och därför kallar jag dem parallellt med kulturella narrativ 
för ”tröstande narrativ” (comforting narratives). 
I avhandlingen ingår fyra separata artiklar som publicerats, eller 
som är godkända för publikation, i akademiska journaler. På olika sätt 
aktualiserar dessa fyra studier de kulturella narrativ som jag menar 
möjliggör en marginalisering av människor med funktions-
nedsättningar. I narrativen framträder några problematiska aspekter 
särskilt tydligt, och dessa kan sammanfattas i sex påståenden: (1) 
funktionsnedsättningar är detsamma som katastrof och lidande, och därför 
oförenliga med lycka och god livskvalité; (2) människor med 
funktionsnedsättning är definierade, kallade och bedömda utifrån deras 
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genetiska uppsättning, och därför sedda som funktionsnedsatta i första 
hand, och människor i andra hand; (3) människor med kognitiva 
funktionsnedsättningar är inte personer eller fullvärdiga människor, 
eftersom de antas sakna förmåga att tänka rationellt; (4) eliminering av 
(människor med) funktionsnedsättningar leder till social förbättring, 
eftersom föräldrar och samhället inte blir ekonomiskt eller socialt 
belastade av dem, och eftersom ökad hälsa är ett tecken på samhällelig 
utveckling; (5) funktionsnedsättningar är det ultimata hotet mot ett liberalt 
värdesystem i vilket autonomi, individuell frihet och val, nytta, 
produktivitet, effektivitet och framgång är viktiga ideal; och sist, men 
kanske mest problematiskt, (6) idén om ett inklusivt människovärde 
förunnas endast människor som passar in i ett normalitetsparadigm, och 
därför är människor med funktionsnedsättningar mindre värda än så 
kallade normala människor.    
I avhandlingen diskuteras en rad historiska och samtida 
föreställningar om kroppslighet, hälsa, reproduktion, och människo-
värde. Därigenom exemplifierar jag olika sätt på vilka en begränsad 
syn på både det mänskliga och på moral manifesteras. Utifrån dessa 
pekar denna avhandling på behovet av ett etiskt ramverk som öppnar 
upp för att tänka kritiskt kring sociala implikationer av olikhet och 
annorlundaskap, och kring sätt på vilka vissa människor ses som 
mindre värda än andra. Förutom en kritisk diskussion innefattar 
avhandlingen också en konstruktiv ansats att bemöta de problematiska 
aspekter som framträder i de kulturella narrativen. I det följande 
presenteras några särdrag i dessa.  
I samhället finns en stark föreställning om att funktion-
snedsättningar är lika med lidande. Historiskt sett har lidande varit en 
central fråga i religiösa och etiska diskurser, inte minst i anslutning till 
frågan om det goda livet. Lindrande, förhindrande och eliminering av 
lidande har blivit viktiga mål inom hälso- och sjukvård, liksom i 
biomedicinsk vetenskap. För att medicinska experter och sjukvårds-
personal fungerar som de primära ”portvakterna” för förståelsen av 
hälsa har den medicinska synen på funktionsnedsättningar 
tillsammans med normalitetsnarrativet stärkt föreställningen att 
funktionsnedsättningar är en katastrof som måste undvikas till varje 
pris. Trots att olika frihetsrörelser – så som kvinnorörelsen och 
handikapprörelsen – gjort anspråk på rollen som portvaktare för hälsa, 
har dessa tenderat att fokusera primärt på att förskjuta makten från en 
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aktör till en annan, utan att grundligt ifrågasätta de förtryckande 
element som finns i inbyggda i själva makten. Därför för jag i den här 
avhandlingen fram argumentet att tolkningsföreträdet vad gäller hälsa 
bör utmanas och flyttas – förslagsvis till teologin – men också att detta 
projekt behöver ha en genomgående självreflexiv och självkritisk 
relation till den makt som tolkningen medför. 
Ett centralt argument, och samtidigt metodiskt grepp, i 
avhandlingen är att erfarenhetsberättelser om funktionsnedsättningar, 
tillsammans med sociala, historiska och kulturella förklaringsmodeller, 
kan vidga den tongivande medicinsk-biologiska synen på det 
mänskliga och på hälsa. Jag menar alltså att kroppar som skiljer sig 
radikalt från den förmodade normen kan producera ny kunskap om 
mänskligt varande, samtidigt som det också bör understrykas att 
många av de berättelser som lyfts fram i avhandlingen vittnar om att 
många funktionsnedsättningar innebär reell smärta och lidande. Den 
springande punkten i många berättelser är dock att smärta och lidande 
inte behöver definiera den totala mänskliga existensen. Många som 
lever med kronisk smärta bär vittne om att det går att lära sig leva med 
smärta. Därför är ett viktigt steg i att tänka annorlunda om 
funktionsnedsättningar att aldrig tillskriva smärta mening. Trots att det 
föreligger en uppenbar risk i att på detta sätt trivialisera en annan 
människas upplevelse av smärta som en tragisk verklighet, menar jag 
att det motsatta är ännu mera problematiskt. I denna avhandling lyfts 
just detta, att funktionsnedsättningar tillskrivs mening, upp som en 
central orsak till att människor med funktionsnedsättningar blivit offer 
för marginalisering. Genom att lyssna till, och ta på allvar, berättelser 
om och av människor i smärta, menar jag att vi bättre kan förstå vad 
det innebär att acceptera smärta och lidande som oundvikliga element 
av det mänskliga livet och varandet. Genom dessa berättelser kan 
relationen mellan kroppen och självet, mellan enskilda subjekt och 
samhället, visa på en viss frihet från de kroppsliga begränsningar varje 
människa står inför. 
Utöver detta narrativa perspektiv diskuterar jag i avhandlingen en 
specifik teologisk syn på mänskligt varande och hälsa. Denna 
teologiska syn baserar sig särskilt på en så kallad kroppsöverskridande 
och relationell föreställning av den mänskliga existensen. Jag 
argumenterar för att ett sådant perspektiv öppnar upp för ett synsätt 
som ger utrymmer för tanken att personliga relationer är både 
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nödvändiga och avgörande för mänskligt välbefinnande. Därtill 
öppnar det upp för en syn på hälsa som inte jämställer funktions-
nedsättningar med helheten av mänskligt varande. En teologisk 
förståelse av människor som skapade varelser aktualiserar på vilka sätt 
begränsningar, beroende och relationalitet är inbyggda i det mänskliga, 
vilket jag menar frammana ett specifikt förhållningssätt till andra 
människor. En kropp i smärta behöver en annan människas vård och 
omsorg. Därför kräver lidande hos den andra att vi bemöter den andra 
med solidaritet och kärlek. Detta är det moraliska kravet som finns i 
relationellt mänskligt varande. När mänskligheten och personskapet 
erkänns i den andre, i den med funktionsnedsättningar, är det 
moraliska kravet att underlätta livsomständigheterna för den andra – 
att göra den andras liv uthärdligt. Detta förhållningssätt manar var och 
en att sitta med den som lider, och tillsammans bära det som verkar 
vara olidligt. Människor som konstant blottas av sin sårbarhet och sitt 
behov av andras hjälp kan lära de som desperat försöker dölja sin egen 
sårbarhet att livet kan vara gott så som det är. Därför framhåller jag att 
människor med funktionsnedsättningar bär vittne om skönheten i 
ömsesidigt beroende, snarare än om en fruktansvärd isolation. Ur detta 
perspektiv behöver inte funktionsnedsättningar utesluta goda 
framtidsutsikter eller en god livskvalité. 
Jag argumenterar för att ett teologiskt perspektiv kan förändra sättet 
på vilket hälsa vanligen upplevs och förklaras, och därmed kan tanken 
om ett inklusivt männoskovärdesbegrepp  rimliggöras. Frågan om hur 
principen om alla människors lika värde kan göras relevant, beror sist 
och slutligen på de sociala och politiska nätverk som människor finns 
i, hur människor blir betraktade och behandlade, och huruvida 
livsomständigheterna för människor underlättas. Ett inklusivt 
människovärdesbegrepp är således i händerna på den andre, eftersom 
allt mänskligt liv är det. Därför försvarar jag i den här avhandlingen 
människovärdesprincipen som ett värdeåtagande som förkroppsligas i 
institutioner och praktiker, och i små gester som uttrycker ”det är gott 
att du finns”. Detta förhållningssätt är i kontexten för denna 
avhandling förklarat genom idén om vänskap eller nära relationer. Den 
syn på vänskap som jag diskuterar handlar i grunden om ömsesidigt 
beroende, och om en syn på kärlek som sårbar. En sådan kärlek 
placerar den egna lyckan i händerna på den andre. Genom att inte 
bestämma hur eller vem den andre borde vara för att ses som värdefull, 
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kan vänskap och kärlek fungera som redskap för att bredda på själva 
livssynen. På detta sätt kan vänskap också förstås som en motberättelse 
till tongivande etiska narrativ, och som en katalysator for moralisk 
transformation.  
Trots att det ofta sägs att egenskaper och kapaciteter inte är 
kriterium för innehavandet av människovärde finns det en stark 
tendens i kulturen, speciellt inom hälso- och sjukvården, att anta att 
människor med funktionsnedsättningar är mindre värda – moraliskt, 
ekonomiskt, och mänskligt – än människor som kan sägas passa in i 
normalitetsparadigmet. Jag menar att om en tar på allvar att 
människovärde och mänskliga rättigheter är centrala värderingar i 
samhället, måste vi garantera att alla former av mänskligt liv skyddas 
av dessa värderingar. I ett sådant samhälle kan inte praktiker existera 
som ifrågasätter värdet hos vissa människor. Istället för att människor 
ska anpassas efter ett färdigformat samhälle, bör alla människor – så 
som mänskligt liv faktiskt levs och upplevs – först erkännas, och utifrån 
den mångfald av mänsklig erfarenhet som finns bör samhället formas.  
Historien kan inte ändras, men precis som historien formar nuet kan 
handlingar och förhållningssätt idag forma framtiden. Så som 
fosterdiagnostikpraxisen och praxisen kring selektiv abort ser ut idag 
bidrar den inte till en framtid i vilken diversitet bland människor 
uppmärksammas och ses som värdefull. Istället skapar den eugeniska 
logik som finns inbyggd i sådana praktiker ett samhälle i vilket vissa 
människor är värdefulla och värdiga, medan andra inte är det. Istället 
för att skapa en värld utifrån redan bestämda idéer om vem som gör 
världen vacker, kunde den sanna skönheten i världen upptäckas 
genom acceptans av den oförutsägbarhet mänskligt liv innebär – i 
vilken form den än tar.  
Inklusiva samhällen är välkomnande samhällen. Ett samhälle som 
välkomnar människor med funktionsnedsättningar värdesätter deras 
närvaro och saknar dem om de inte är där. Inklusion handlar därför 
inte bara om att acceptera någon som redan är här, men om att säga att 
världen faktiskt är en vackrare plats tack vare denna någons närvaro. 
Alla människor vill bli erkända och värdesatta, och därför handlar 
inklusion inte enbart om någon enskild individ eller minoritetsgrupp, 
men om alla människor. Inklusion är inte primärt ett politiskt program, 
men ett förhållningssätt och en attityd. Det är ett sätt att tänka, och ett 
sätt att behandla andra. Därför finns det moralisk signifikans i hur 
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människor relaterar till varandra. Inklusion handlar alltså om att alla 
människor är värdefulla, och om att alla människor har rätt att höra till.    
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